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THE FOG OF WAR REFORM: CHANGE
AND STRUCTURE IN THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
PETER MARGULIES*
Salim Hamdan’s conviction in a military commission for material
support of Al Qaeda separates utilitarians, who generally defer to state
power, from protective theorists, who seek to shield civilians by curbing
official discretion. Utilitarians view military commissions as efficient
means for trying suspected terrorists. Protective theorists criticize the
amorphous nature of material support charges.
The clash between utilitarians and protective theorists colors other
issues, including “enhanced” interrogation and limits on targeting.
Protective theorists merit praise for their scrutiny of interrogation. In
contrast, utilitarians have trivialized interrogation abuses. However,
protective theorists’ scrutiny of states is burdened by hindsight bias.
Failing to recognize the challenges faced by states, protective theorists
have ignored the risk to civilians posed by changes such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross’ Guidance on Direct
Participation in Hostilities that create a “revolving door” shielding bomb
makers for terrorist groups.
To move beyond the utilitarian–protective debate, this piece advances
a structural approach informed by two values: a linear time horizon and
holistic signaling. Drawing on cognitive studies of humans’ flawed
temporal judgment and the Framers’ work on institutional design, a linear
time horizon curbs both myopia that infects officials and hindsight bias
that plagues the protective model. Holistic signaling requires the United
States to support the law of armed conflict, even (or especially) when
adversaries such as Al Qaeda reject that framework. Applying the
structural test, a state can use a sliding scale of imminence and necessity to
justify targeting Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists in states unwilling or unable
to apprehend them. However, the material support charges against
Hamdan signal a troubling turn to victors’ justice.

* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. I thank Bill Banks, Bill Kuebler, and
David Luban for comments on a previous draft.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Driving Osama bin Laden was not a Broadway play. Years before
the Al Qaeda leader entered the compound in Abottabad, Pakistan,
that became his last residence, a Yemeni national, Salim Hamdan, acted
as his driver, doubling as bodyguard and weapons broker. Hamdan
knew the general purpose of Al Qaeda’s plots but did not aid a
particular conspiracy. Yet, during the American intervention in
Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, United States forces took
custody of Hamdan, eventually charging him with material support of a
terrorist group, which Congress in 2006 made a crime triable before a
1
military commission. International law and the Constitution’s Ex Post
2
Facto Clause would make his 2008 conviction problematic, unless his
3
conduct violated the common law of war.
As Hamdan’s case illustrates, September 11 intensified conflict over
changes in international humanitarian law (IHL) that states and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had been debating since the
4
Cold War and the twilight of European colonialism. In the immediate
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration asserted
that suspected terrorists were not even entitled to protection under IHL,
otherwise known as the “law of war” or the “law of armed conflict”
5
(LOAC). IHL’s leading NGO, the International Committee of the Red
1. See United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1259, 1274 (C.M.C.R. 2011).
Congress had acted after the Supreme Court struck down the presidential order unilaterally
establishing military commissions. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also DAVID LUBAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 14–15 (2010) (discussing basic principles of criminal
law, including (1) legality, which states that a person cannot be convicted for conduct that is
not unlawful, (2) fair notice, and (3) that no criminal law be applied retroactively).
3. In June 2011, a military court upheld his conviction. See Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at
1254. Earning credit for time served, he was released in January 2009. Id. at 1260.
4. See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in
Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing
Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 201–04 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and
Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J.
INT’L L. 795, 796 (2010); Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants,
Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy 1–2 (Harv. U. Program on
Humanitarian Pol’y & Conflict Res., Occasional Paper Series, No. 2, Winter 2005)
[hereinafter Watkin, Warriors Without Rights], available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/
default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper2.pdf.
5. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to the President (Jan. 25, 2002), in THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 118, 118–19 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua
L. Dratel eds., 2005). Bush administration officials also sought to preclude federal courts
from reviewing the legality of detentions. See PETER MARGULIES, LAW’S DETOUR: JUSTICE
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Cross (ICRC), also entered the change game, proposing curbs on the
6
targeting of nominal civilians who participate in hostilities. Both the
Bush administration and ICRC efforts failed to command a consensus
among stakeholders. Exploring the reasons for that failure, and the
probability of change on other fronts, requires a structural theory of
LOAC, which I offer in this Article.
The course of change in the law has been unsteady because of the
role of non-state actors. When states were the primary actors in armed
7
conflicts, reciprocity helped assure cooperation. States were repeat
8
players in armed conflicts, and therefore had an incentive to regard
such conflicts as prisoner’s dilemma games with infinite iterations. In
such games, today’s defection by one party is promptly punished by the
offended party. Because the original offender knows that defecting
from the accepted framework will not yield a net return, timely
9
retaliation restores the normative equilibrium.
Reciprocity has less of a hold on non-state actors. While certain
10
rebel groups may see themselves as aspiring repeat players, terrorist

DISPLACED IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 54–57 (2010); see also KAREN GREENBERG,
THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 45–47 (2009) (describing postSeptember 11 government legal opinions concluding that Guantanamo detentions would not
be subject to judicial review). The Supreme Court pushed back in a series of cases,
culminating in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (striking down habeas corpusstripping provisions of Military Commissions Act of 2006).
6. See NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 33–36 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC GUIDANCE], available at
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/20/Legal%20Conference/ICRC_002_0990.pdf.
7. See MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE LAW
OF WAR 33 (2009) (stating that, in LOAC, “reciprocity was long considered a crucial method
of deterring war crime”); Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial
Cosmopolitanism, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW: 2007–2008, at 23, 37 (2008) (asserting
that reciprocity enforces norms on treatment of prisoners of war and that a party to a conflict
treats captives from its adversary’s forces well to encourage the same treatment of its
captured forces); cf. Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365,
397 (2009) (discussing importance of reciprocity in Fourth Hague Convention of 1907).
8. See Watts, supra note 7, at 401.
9. See Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT’L ORG. 1, 6–8
(1986); Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 506
(2006) [hereinafter Posner, Welfarist Approach].
10. See Audie Klotz, Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S.
Sanctions Against South Africa, 49 INT’L ORG. 451, 463 (1995) (discussing the collaboration
between the African National Congress and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to call for
international sanctions on South Africa); see also Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra
note 4, at 36 (discussing certain groups’ concern about international opinion).
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networks such as Al Qaeda envision an ideal dominion in the indefinite
11
future untouched by reciprocity’s mundane demands.
Violent non-state actors such as terrorist networks reject the
transparency that LOAC seeks to promote. For example, LOAC has
traditionally required that individuals participating in hostilities wear
12
insignias that set them apart from civilians. Consider a group that
orders a suicide bombing on a crowded bus. The bomber has violated
the insignia requirement; moreover, the bus bombing also violates the
principle of distinction, another traditional requirement of LOAC,
which requires a party to an armed conflict to target only those
13
individuals who participate in the conflict. Such violations complicate
compliance for states whose nationals are the planned victims of attacks.
State compliance with the principle of distinction is difficult when
members of organized armed groups do not wear insignias. Moreover,
uncertainty about the time and place of the next terrorist attack tempts
11. See ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE
TERRORISM 121–22 (2005) (quoting Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s longtime second
in command and successor, as envisioning “restoration of the caliphate”); cf. BRUCE
HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 169 (1998) (“[T]errorists . . . live in the future . . . for that
distant—yet imperceptibly close—point in time when they will assuredly triumph over their
enemies and attain the ultimate realization of their political destiny.”).
12. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art. 4(A)(2)(b), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention]. In controversial moves that leading states have not fully accepted, the 1977
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions allowed non-state actors “fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes” to assert lawful
authority for their efforts, and it also allowed parties engaged in nonconventional warfare to
refuse to wear distinguishing insignia or carry arms openly until the time immediately
preceding an attack. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art.
1(4), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. The United
States has declined to ratify Additional Protocol I because of concerns about these provisions,
but it considers other provisions of Protocol I to be customary international law that binds
both states and individuals. See Michael J. Matheson, Remarks, Session One: The United
States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 420 (1987); cf.
Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against
Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 344–47 (2009) (discussing political agendas that contributed
to enactment of Protocol I).
13. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 48; see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
VIOLENCE OF PEACE: AMERICA’S WARS IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 58 (2011) (referring to
principle of “discrimination” that bars targeting noncombatants); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 89 (2d
ed. 2010); MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT § 1.2.2 (2006)
(describing principle of distinction as the “foundation” of LOAC).

18 - MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE)

1422

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/9/2012 10:27 PM

[95:1417

states to engage in coercive interrogation techniques that violate
14
LOAC.
Two schools of thought have sought to cope with reciprocity’s
declining influence. Many NGOs favor what this Article calls the
protective approach. The protective approach emerged from a concern
with shielding civilians that is part and parcel of core LOAC principles,
15
such as distinction. From this widely shared point of origin, however,
followers of the protective paradigm soon wade into greater
controversy. The protective agenda entails easing limits on non-state
organized armed groups and imposing new constraints on states. For
example, the protective paradigm allows groups to act without
16
distinguishing insignias until the very brink of an armed attack. NGOs
pursuing the protective paradigm have also sought to limit states’ ability
17
to target non-state actors that participate in violence. The protective
agenda would allow organized armed groups to maximize the
18
information asymmetries they currently enjoy, without undertaking the
burdens that states must accept.
Unfortunately, the protective
paradigm’s partisans fail to recognize that allowing non-state actors to
free ride in this fashion only enhances the risk to civilians.

14. See OSIEL, supra note 7, at 57; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 75
(barring torture and “violence” directed at detainees); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 3(1)(a), (c), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] (barring torture, cruelty, and
“humiliating and degrading treatment”).
15. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(5)(b) (requiring proportionality by
barring attacks causing collateral damage to civilians that are “excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”); SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.1.1.4
(explaining that the rule of proportionality is derived from the principle of distinction).
16. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 44(3).
17. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 33–36. For disagreement with the ICRC’s
position, see Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The
Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 699 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt,
Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities] (criticizing the ICRC’s guidance as failing
“to fully appreciate the operational complexity of modern warfare”); and Kenneth Watkin,
Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in
Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 643–44 (2010)
[hereinafter Watkin, Opportunity Lost] (criticizing the ICRC’s guidance as creating
asymmetries favoring non-state actors over states); see also infra notes 233–241 (arguing that
ICRC guidance is not viable as a change to LOAC).
18. Information asymmetries are gaps that favor one party. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese et
al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 277, 280 (2004) (stating “information asymmetries between producers and consumers
[are] widely accepted as justifying certain kinds of regulatory interventions”).
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For a convenient bookend to the protective paradigm, consider what
I call the utilitarian perspective. While utilitarians recognize the peril of
non-state actors’ free riding, they propose an overbroad remedy:
loosening all state constraints not required by reciprocity. Utilitarians
rely on the leaders of strong democracies, particularly the United States,
19
to arrive at the greatest good for the greatest possible number.
Competing internal actors, such as courts, or external stakeholders, such
20
as NGOs, lack the information to provide useful alternatives.
Unfortunately, utilitarians’ certitude blinds them to the United States’
stake in a world order that depends on LOAC’s norms.
Rules sought by both the protective and utilitarian schools have
been highly unstable in application and acceptance. Attempts to ease
limits on armed non-state actors have been greeted with skepticism by
strong states, which have tended to believe that such changes would put
21
civilians, as well as their own forces, at greater risk. However, the
utilitarians’ proposed changes have fared no better. Efforts to create a
gap in the applicability of IHL to suspected terrorists have roiled both
rule of law constituencies abroad and institutions at home, such as the
22
courts and the military. More recent efforts to try suspected terrorists
19. See generally Posner, Welfarist Approach, supra note 9, at 490–91.
20. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 26 (2010) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND]; ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 62–64 (2009) (asserting
that NGOs are largely irrelevant to operative global norms, which states set); ERIC A.
POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS 274–75 (2007) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE]
(arguing that legal curbs on national security strategy are futile and inefficient); JOHN YOO,
WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 106 (2006)
(arguing that legal restrictions can slow down intelligence efforts and put national security at
risk). But see Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the
Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 66 (2011)
(criticizing Posner and Vermeule as too readily dismissing constraints); Deborah N.
Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 783, 785–88 (2011) (arguing against undue deference to executive branch). An
early collaborator of Posner’s, Harvard’s Jack Goldsmith, has most recently combined
lingering wariness about the efficacy of international institutions with a recognition of the
utility of constraints. Compare JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (2005) (expressing skepticism about NGOs’ agendas and states’
interests), with Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1835 (2009) (discussing accounts of
international and constitutional law as coordinated games in which parties decline short-term
benefits to realize gains over time).
21. See Newton, supra note 12, at 343–47.
22. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006) (defining non-international
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in military commissions for material support of terrorism have also
23
triggered controversy.
Explaining the failure of these innovations requires a structural
24
model of LOAC, in which changes develop in a two-level game. One
level involves domestic institutions, including the executive branch, the
military, and the courts. On the second level, strong states, including the
United States and its European allies, interact with NGOs. Strong
states usually seek utilitarian changes, while NGOs such as the ICRC
advance a protective agenda.
Leaders that persuade domestic
stakeholders in Level 1 will also find common ground with NGOs in
Level 2. In contrast, state initiatives that lack domestic institutional
support will face unified NGO opposition. By the same token, NGOs
that fail to elicit support from Level 1 stakeholders will face unified
opposition from strong democracies and splintering within their own
coalition. Interaction at both levels turns on two values: linear time
horizons and holistic signaling.
A linear time horizon, focused on by both the Founders and modern
cognitive psychologists, requires rational discounting of present and
long-term risks and understanding of both immediate and long-term
25
Unfortunately, this ideal is difficult to attain for both
causes.
individuals and organizations. Each skews time horizons, unduly
26
discounting anything beyond the present and immediate future.
armed conflict governed by Geneva Common Article 3’s constraints as including any conflict
not between nations, including United States’ conflict with Al Qaeda); Deborah Pearlstein,
Justice Stevens and the Expert Executive, 99 GEO. L.J. 1301, 1310–11 (2011) [hereinafter
Pearlstein, Justice Stevens] (discussing factors that drove Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion in
Hamdan).
23. See David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military
Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 24–31 (2005) (retracing early American history of military
commissions and finding persistent ambiguity about authority for creating them, particularly
through unilateral executive action).
24. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 436 (1988).
25. I use the term “linear” metaphorically here, to convey a norm that approximates the
discounting of a rational actor. Graphing this function would actually require a curve. See
Philip Streich & Jack S. Levy, Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice, 51 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 199, 201–03 & fig.1 (2007) (graphing rational discount function).
26. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 45–46 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (noting
tendency to inappropriately discount future costs); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 443–44 (1997) (stating that “commitment
mechanisms” such as savings plans are tools that correct for the tendency to unduly discount
the future); George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J.
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Cognitive psychologists call this flaw myopia or presentism. Cognitive
flaws also distort perceptions of the past through myopia’s rearview
mirror: hindsight bias.
In hindsight bias, people focus on the
immediately apparent causes of harm, particularly if that harm is
27
graphic and vivid. Longer-term causes get short shrift.
Just as individuals use savings accounts as a hedge against myopia
and maxims like “hindsight is 20/20” to ward off hindsight bias, states
and organizations develop structural features to deal with flaws in
temporal judgment. Hamilton viewed judicial review as a crucial
28
safeguard against rule by the “humors” of the moment, and courts
since the Founding Era have sought to harmonize statutes, the
29
To
Constitution, and international law, including the law of war.
preserve temporal balance, Level 1 institutions such as domestic courts
have long upheld what I call “identification norms.” These core norms
ensure that government uses reliable criteria to apply its power.
Violations engender arbitrary results and undermine courts’ integrity.
Since the Founding Era, courts have protected identification norms in
30
31
NGOs have
wartime cases involving property and persons.
consistently sought to reinforce this understanding. Courts also have
32
33
forged doctrines, including official immunities, standing, and the
ECON. 1209, 1228 (2003) (explaining the consequences of hyperbolic discounting); Daniel
Read, Intertemporal Choice, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 424, 428–29 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2007) (noting tendency of
individuals to prefer “smaller-sooner reward”); Streich & Levy, supra note 25, at 205 (“[T]he
value of a reward drops significantly in the immediate future, so that individuals are very
impatient with regard to short time delays” (citation omitted)).
27. See Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases
in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 345
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (explaining that individuals can find a large number of
predictors for an event with almost any desired correlation); George Loewenstein & Erik
Angner, Predicting and Indulging Changing Preferences, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 351, 372 (George
Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003) (defining hindsight bias as a situation where “people project
their own current knowledge on themselves in the past”).
28. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
29. See David Golove, The Supreme Court, the War on Terror, and the American Just
War Constitutional Tradition, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 561, 561–62 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011).
30. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 120–21 (1804).
31. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
32. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 ¶¶ 51–53, Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg., 2002 I.C.J.
3 (Feb. 14, 2002) (analyzing official immunity under international law). But see id. ¶ 61
(holding that officials do not have immunity in international tribunals, which consider charges
of torture or violation of other fundamental norms). See generally LUBAN ET AL., supra note
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political question doctrine,34 that curb hindsight bias by limiting judicial
second-guessing of executive action in wartime.
A linear time horizon alone is insufficient to support the structure of
35
LOAC; the second element is what I call holistic signaling. In a world
of imperfect information, a party sends a signal to provide data about its
intentions and capabilities, limiting the risk of misunderstanding or
mistrust. For example, the white flag of surrender gained acceptance
because a party accepting surrender requires assurance that those
inviting capture are not luring in their attacker to get a better shot and a
party inviting capture must know that it will not be slaughtered where it
stands. Since neither side knows the precise intent of the other,
bloodshed would continue without a symbol that bridges the gap.
Holistic signaling reveals a party’s commitment to habits that
facilitate multilateral cooperation. Strong states with a stake in the
global system must send signals on LOAC that are consistent with their
36
wishes for the system as a whole. Holistic signals are important even
(or perhaps especially) when some parties will decline to reciprocate.
This divorce from reciprocity and tangible benefits leads utilitarians,
37
who raised awareness of the signaling lexicon, to view holistic signaling
as an afterthought. However, utilitarians fail to understand that an
audience of other states, NGOs, and international public opinion that
perceives strong states as free riders will no longer look to those states
for leadership.
To examine the prospects for change in LOAC, we need to assess
the time horizons and signaling capabilities of states, NGOs, and nonstate actors. States start out with an edge in the time horizon category
2, at 265–95 (analyzing current law of official immunity).
33. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see also Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 14–35 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that father lacked standing to bring suit in challenge
to alleged targeting of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, whom the United States regarded as the leader of
Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula).
34. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 9–10, 52 (holding that
legality of targeting United States citizen allegedly engaged in terrorist acts abroad is political
question textually committed to other branches). See generally Robert M. Chesney, National
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1392–1400 (2009) (discussing factors triggering
judicial deference to executive determinations).
35. See OSIEL, supra note 7, at 312–14 (using compliance with LOAC to signal faith in
the system); see also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18–23 (2000) (discussing
signaling in everyday contexts).
36. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY 212–13 (2008).
37. See POSNER, supra note 35, at 18–27.
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because their existence over time in a fixed space lends stability.38 To
gain additional perspectives and correct for myopia, they can develop
deliberative bodies such as courts and participate in international
39
institutions. States’ need to exist in a stable territory over time also
provides a substantial incentive to respect the comparable needs of
other states. States signal their commitment to reciprocity in armed
conflict through signals, such as requiring their forces to wear uniforms.
However, even democratic states find their time horizon and signaling
skewed in times of crises.
While crises lead strong states into “states of exception” where
40
norms do not hold, the standard operating procedures of armed nonstate actors reveal pervasive deficits in temporal judgment and signaling.
In terrorist networks, for example, the need to preserve secrecy impedes
41
Moreover,
the development of diverse deliberative institutions.
terrorist networks like Al Qaeda, which seek a new dawn of the
caliphate, not the dreary task of administration, have no incentive to
42
signal in ways that conform to LOAC.
Ironically, NGOs’ focus on combating the myopia of states
compounds their own time horizon and signaling problems. NGOs
strive to uphold identification norms that states sometimes discount.
However, NGOs have few institutional checks against myopia’s twin,
hindsight bias. NGOs’ donor base rewards prompt and vigorous
criticism of state conduct, but typically discounts the challenges
43
governments face in an uncertain world. Hindsight bias and signaling
38. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 54 (1977).
39. See Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus ad
Bellum: A Normative Framework, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT:
EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 157, 174 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007)
(“States perform useful functions in the international system; indeed, the global architecture
relies on States.”).
40. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095,
1096–98 (2009); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1014–18 (2003).
41. See HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 179–80.
42. See Max Abrahms, What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and
Counterterrorism Strategy, INT’L SECURITY, Spring 2008, at 78, 85–86 (noting that terrorist
organizations do not want compromise).
43. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 60 (2007) (critiquing incentive structure of NGOs); Kenneth
Anderson, “Accountability” as “Legitimacy”: Global Governance, Global Civil Society and
the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 841, 842–44 (2011) (same).
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take a different turn, however, when strong states intervene to prevent
humanitarian catastrophes. Many NGOs urge such intervention despite
their concerns about collateral damage and the absence (as in Kosovo)
44
of formal United Nations authorization. Moreover, some NGOs send
subtle pro-intervention signals by downplaying their denunciation of
measures, such as targeted killing, that could also be strategically
advantageous in humanitarian interventions.
Where state officials face temptations to skew their time horizon and
weaken compliance signals, stakeholders at Levels 1 and 2 will resist
utilitarian changes. This dynamic stymied proposed utilitarian changes
like depriving suspected terrorists of Geneva protections. By the same
token, strong states will block protective changes that increase a nonstate actor’s ability to free ride. The ICRC’s proposed limits on states’
ability to target individuals, such as bomb makers, have met this fate.
Focusing on differentials in temporal judgment and signaling
capacity is also useful for examining emerging problems in LOAC,
including determining which crimes are triable by military commissions
and the appropriate scope of self-defense. Punishing individuals
captured years ago for the freshly enacted war crime of material support
would violate the linear time horizon’s central tenet—that notice must
precede conduct that gives rise to punishment. Similarly, making
material support a war crime would send the dangerous signal that war
crimes are no different from the ordinary criminal law. A structural
approach would allow greater flexibility in targeted killing, including a
sliding scale for self-defense based on both the imminence and certainty
45
of a threat. However, a state would have to observe identification
norms and restrict its targeting to fighters for Al Qaeda or associated
groups that international organizations have identified as global terrorist
threats found in countries that are unwilling or unable to apprehend or
target those individuals.
This Article is in six parts. Part II provides a brief primer on
continuity and change in LOAC. Part III assesses the virtues and vices
44. See Richard J. Goldstone, The Role of the International Criminal Court, in MASS
ATROCITY CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTURE OUTRAGES 55, 61 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2010)
(describing how NATO forces in Kosovo minimized civilian casualties despite heavy bombing
campaigns).
45. See Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, in 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 4–5, 19–22, 24 (Michael N. Schmitt et al. eds., 2011) (analyzing
justifications for state’s use of deadly force to eliminate suspected terrorists).
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of the utilitarian and protective approaches to LOAC changes. Part IV
introduces the structural approach, including linear time horizon and
holistic signaling. Part V compares the temporal judgment and signaling
capacities of states, non-state actors, and NGOs, and applies the model
to the Bush administration’s proposed changes on interrogations and
the ICRC’s suggested targeting limits. Part VI offers analysis of
material support as a war crime and remote targeted killing. Part VII
addresses criticisms of the model, including the argument that it
privileges Western modes of warfare.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICT
The law of war is an evolving effort to preserve ways to end
hostilities and enforce a bright line between combatants, who can be
targeted, and those on the outside (the hors de combat), who are
46
immune. Bright lines do not stop the bloodshed of war. However,
they channel it to prevent unnecessary killing and to limit war’s impact.
Rules are crucial because more amorphous boundaries would
exacerbate information asymmetries. Gaps in information about a
party’s intentions and capacities impede cooperation in business and
47
politics. They destroy the potential for cooperation in the already
fractious environment of the battlefield.
Illustrating the role and importance of rules, LOAC protects
individuals such as civilians, who lack the right to target others; it also
protects combatants who wish to leave the fray through surrender to the
48
enemy. Soldiers will surrender only if they can be assured that they
will be treated humanely, and they will fight on beyond the needs of
49
strategy if they cannot be so assured. Similarly, using the pretense of
50
surrender to kill an adversary constitutes the war crime of perfidy.
46. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 18 (discussing distress caused by Henry V’s order to
kill French captives during the battle of Agincourt, which the English ultimately won, and
English knights’ refusal to obey order, in part out of concern for “‘dishonor that . . . would
reflect on themselves’” (footnte omitted)); Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra note 4, at
64 (“[T]here has always been an obligation to distinguish combatants from civilians.”).
47. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 271–72 (1984).
48. See 2 PIERINO BELLI, A TREATISE ON MILITARY MATTERS AND WARFARE 88
(Herbert C. Nutting trans., 1936) (quoting Cicero).
49. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 8–9 (2010) (discussing World War II battle of Iwo Jima).
50. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 46 (noting that prisoners of war can seek to escape,
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LOAC prohibit perfidy precisely because it produces doubt in a
capturing force about the sincerity of a defeated force’s attempt to
surrender, and thereby discourages a victorious force from honoring
that attempt. The result is a spiral toward the wholesale abuse of
captives on both sides.
51
The laws of war that protect captives and prohibit perfidy have long
been enforced through reciprocity. Each side knows that it can readily
find itself in the position where it must either surrender or accept the
surrender of an opponent. Obeying ground rules in these situations
gives one’s opponent an incentive to do the same. If parties know they
will see each other through the course of an armed conflict, or have
dealings upon that conflict’s resolution, upholding reciprocity is prudent
as well as legally and ethically mandatory.
The customary understandings about LOAC is that structured
warfare for centuries became inadequate because of the advent of
centralized states, the rise of technology, and the increasing prominence
of violent non-state actors in the last two hundred years. The mass
armies mobilized during the Napoleonic Era supplanted the smaller
52
Innovations in arms,
mercenary units of contending monarchs.
including the advent of machine guns and the later rise of air power,
53
deepened the risk of harm to civilians. The Lieber Code, drafted
during the American Civil War, prioritized military necessity but also
acknowledged the “distinction between the private individual belonging
to a hostile country and . . . its men in arms,” adding that the latter
should “be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the
54
exigencies of war will admit.” The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration
but can be punished if they kill a guard, since those surrendering “committed themselves to
stop fighting . . . [and] gave up their right to kill”).
51. See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, FLORENTINE HISTORIES 166–67 (Laura F. Banfield &
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., trans., 1988) (recounting a cautionary example of a military leader
who mistreated captives).
52. See Michael Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century
War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, in THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 389, 394 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green
eds., 1998).
53. SOLIS, supra note 49, at 51 (discussing developments in weaponry during the
nineteenth century); Schmitt, supra note 52, at 394; Schmitt, supra note 4, at 814–16
(discussing the effect of antipersonnel mines and incendiary and chemical weapons on civilian
populations).
54. See Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field, at art. 22 (Apr. 24, 1863), in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3, 6 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
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adjusted to technological changes by urging “[t]hat the progress of
civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the
calamities of war,” and cautioned against “employment of arms which
55
uselessly aggravate . . . suffering[].”
Parties participating in the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 were
also concerned about the prospect of runaway harm to civilians. Their
agreement included the Martens Clause, which advised that all persons
“remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law [resulting] . . . from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the
56
public conscience.” To make this sentiment more concrete, the 1907
Hague Convention required that combatants act under a fixed
command structure, wear insignia that were visible from a distance, and
57
refrain from killing civilians. The rules on command structure and
insignia promoted discipline and prevented perfidy; they also had a
prophylactic effect in both warning civilians about the proximity of
armed forces and promoting accountability for lapses in discipline that
58
resulted in needless civilian deaths.
The increased use of mass armies also required careful demarcations
on the scope of accountability, which separated wrongful decisions to
initiate war—the domain of jus ad bellum—from the wrongful conduct
of war, governed by jus in bello. Leaders might order an unjust war to
wrest territory or resources from an opponent. However, soldiers on a
side that fought an unjust war were nonetheless privileged to fight as
long as they themselves did not commit war crimes, such as harming
59
captives or civilians. This separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello
Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
55. See Preamble to Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, in LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 54, at
91, 92; see also SOLIS, supra note 49, at 50 (discussing St. Petersburg Declaration); Schmitt,
supra note 4, at 799 (same).
56. See Preamble to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and Its Annex, in LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 54, at 60, 61; see also
DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 13, at 8–9 (discussing Martens
Clause); Schmitt, supra note 4, at 800 (same).
57. See Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra note 4, at 21.
58. The Hague Conference featured disagreement on the formality required of states in
distinguishing their combatants from civilians. Id. at 21.
59. See Lieber Code art. 57, supra note 54, at 10 (stating that a soldier is privileged
belligerent, and hence his killing of other belligerents is not a violation of laws of armed
conflict); Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum
and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 48–49 (2009); cf.
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has both procedural and institutional justifications. As a procedural
matter, prosecuting foot soldiers in an unjust war would itself be unjust.
Going to war is a decision of a national community backed by domestic
laws, which an individual cannot control. Penalizing individuals for a
community decision over which they had no control would be patently
60
unfair. Eroding the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello would
also have significant institutional consequences in an era of mass armies.
The prospect of individual liability for foot soldiers in an unjust war
would encourage draft resistance ex ante, even if the war turned out to
be just. Even just wars can inspire widespread domestic resistance, as
61
Individual liability would
the Civil War draft riots demonstrated.
exacerbate this problem, impairing the ability of states to make
decisions. Furthermore, a state would confront difficulty in ending a
war, if soldiers on the losing side faced individual liability because of the
victor’s view that their cause was unjust. Here, too, individuals might
hold out, electing to fight on because they had no stake in reconciliation.
The separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello alleviates both of these
problems.
The aftermath of World War II saw further significant developments
in both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The Geneva Conventions
codified rules on the treatment of captives by barring torture, cruelty,
62
and degrading treatment; by requiring competent tribunals to
63
determine prisoner of war (POW) status; and by providing courts with
64
procedural guarantees for the adjudication of war crimes.
Technological advances continue to be a concern, although the
International Court of Justice seemed to recognize that permitting
65
nuclear weapons might actually discourage new global conflicts. The
Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in Warfare
Against Nonstate Actors, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 541, 541 (2009) (suggesting that increasing role
of non-state actors has reduced utility of separation).
60. See F.M. Kamm, Failures of Just War Theory: Terror, Harm, and Justice, 114 ETHICS
650, 676–77 (2004).
61. See ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN
SLAVERY 256, 259 (2010).
62. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 3 (forbidding “the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court”). As a matter of customary law, the provisions of this Article
also apply to civilians in both international and non-international armed conflicts.
63. Id. art. 5.
64. Id. art. 3(1)(d).
65. The court formally declined to take a position on the legality of nuclear weapons.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 262
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United Nations Charter barred aggressive war, permitting the use of
force only in self-defense or on the authorization of the Security
66
Council.
In the last forty years, the rise of non-state actors has prompted new
tensions. Drafters of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
believed that non-state actors “fighting against colonial domination and
67
. . . racist régimes” had standing to participate in international armed
conflict. That innovation challenged the traditional jus ad bellum norm
of “right authority,” which extends to state actors the sole privilege of
conducting hostilities while denying this privilege to non-state actors,
whom LOAC has traditionally assumed could obtain a remedy from
68
While compelling examples supporting
their states of nationality.
higher status for non-state actors span centuries, from the American
colonists at Lexington and Concord to the African National Congress
(ANC), the drafters of Additional Protocol I did not provide any
criteria for deciding which group among rivals would be found the
authentic representative. This definitional vacuum left inter-group
violence as the default selection process, risking harm to members of the
community that each group purports to represent.
Protocol I yielded additional anomalies. While it codified the
69
principle of distinction that forbids targeting civilians, it also made
(July 8, 1996); cf. OSIEL, supra note 7, at 66 (commenting on possible rationales for the
court’s decision, including the need to preserve threat of nuclear reprisal as an effective
deterrent). But see DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 13, at 85–86
(criticizing the court for failing to offer clear guidance).
66. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; cf. Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 34–35
(Apr. 9, 1949) (holding that British mine-sweeping operations within Albanian territorial
waters after mine explosions damaged British vessels in “innocent passage” through waters
violated Albanian sovereignty, despite multilateral agreements between Britain, France, the
Soviet Union, and the United States to coordinate regional mine-sweeping); Jonathan A.
Bush, “The Supreme . . . Crime” and Its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of
Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324, 2365–66 (2002) (noting Attorney General and
chief Nuremberg prosecutor Robert Jackson’s view of aggressor nations as “outlaws from the
international community”).
67. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 1(4).
68. See Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra note 4, at 17 (describing the longstanding perception that public wars carried out by the “right authority” are legitimate); 3 E.
DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 318 (James
Brown Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758) (right to make war “belongs solely
to the sovereign power” who is best situated to judge circumstances “of the utmost
importance to the welfare of the State”); cf. SOLIS, supra note 49, at 123–25 (discussing the
United States’ objection to Additional Protocol I’s protection for non-state actors).
69. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 48.
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concessions to irregular forces that severely complicated
implementation of that “basic principle.” Article 44(3) shields such
forces until they have “engaged in a military deployment preceding the
70
launching of an attack.” Some countries have construed this language
as barring targeting of such forces until “‘moments immediately prior to
71
an attack.’” Because a state’s uniformed forces can be targeted at any
72
time, this reading creates a marked asymmetry in the targeting options
of non-state and state actors. The drafters felt that this tactical
advantage would at least encourage non-state actors to shun the most
egregious forms of perfidy, where no arms were displayed until the
73
attack was in progress. Although some non-state actors may have
considered availing themselves of this opportunity, one cannot imagine
74
Al Qaeda operatives following suit. However, a non-state fighting
force without the duty to identify itself will impel states to cut corners
on the principle of distinction, shooting first and asking questions about
participation in hostilities later. As with even more blatant forms of
perfidy, the result is greater risk to those hors de combat.
Because LOAC, like other forms of international law, is increasingly
75
fragmented, the increasing role of non-state actors has buttressed
arguments for giving states more flexibility in the jus ad bellum. For
70. See id. art. 44(3)(b); cf. Corri Zoli, Humanizing Irregular Warfare: Framing
Compliance for Nonstate Armed Groups at the Intersection of Security and Legal Analyses, in
NEW BATTLEFIELDS OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 190, 197
(William C. Banks ed., 2011) (arguing that provisions of Additional Protocol I lessens the
sanctions on violent non-state actors); Newton, supra note 12, at 346–47 (same).
71. See Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra note 4, at 33 n.135 (quoting MICHAEL
BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 254 (1982)).
72. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 142.
73. See Watkin, Warriors Without Rights, supra note 4, at 32–33 & n.132 (citing 15
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED
CONFLICTS 454 (1978) (stating the measure gave “the guerrilla fighter an incentive to
distinguish himself from the civilian population”)).
74. Cf. SOLIS, supra note 49, at 125–29 (discussing the United States’ objection to
Additional Protocol I); Newton, supra note 12, at 360–61 (suggesting that September 11 made
the change obsolete); W. Michael Reisman, Holding the Center of the Law of Armed Conflict,
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 852, 858 (2006) (describing incentive argument as one of “doubtful
logic”).
75. See Marko Milanović, Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?,
20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 69, 69 (2009) (discussing tensions between human rights and
other sources of international law); Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional
Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 485
(2008) (rejecting claim that “single regime” can govern international law on regulation and
private property).
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example, states dealing with ideologically committed terrorist networks
have sought to relax the customary requirement of imminent attack as a
condition for self-defense. Scholars argued that obliging a state to wait
until a terrorist plot approaches consummation was both unrealistic and
76
risky for civilians whom the network plans to target.
These debates have accelerated since September 11. Two opposing
developments each reflected an effort to change LOAC. First, in the
eighteen months after September 11, Bush administration officials
sought to deprive suspected terrorists of protections against coercive
interrogation and also sought to establish indefinite detention without
judicial review and military commission trials that lacked fundamental
77
guarantees of fairness. Even more recently, the ICRC proposed that
civilians be shielded from targeting even if they have participated in
78
Over the objections of a majority of commentators
hostilities.
convened for its study, the ICRC asserted that only civilians with a
narrowly defined “continuous combat function” could be targeted at all
times. Others could in effect choose the time and place of their
vulnerability, even as they planned a return to the fray. Each change
threatened to destabilize LOAC.

76. See Oscar Schachter, The Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 309, 316 (1989) (arguing that use of force against terrorist bases was
appropriate under international law). After September 11, the United Nations Security
Council urged states to use a range of means, including force if necessary, against terrorist
groups planning deadly attacks. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373, at 2 (Sept. 28,
2001); William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S.
Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 678–79 (2003); Chesney, supra note 45, at 5
(outlining the different circumstances where states might find a need to use deadly force);
Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11,
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 244–46 (2011). But see Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with
Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW
GOVERNING ETHICAL FORCE IN CONTEXT 11 (Simon Bronitt ed., forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 (arguing for strict test of self-defense).
77. See MARGULIES, supra note 5, at 14–23; CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE
RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 138–39 (2007); cf. GOLDSMITH, supra note 43, at 106–10 (recounting by Bush
administration official who in 2003 sought to modify aggressive legal opinions underlying
policies). On military commissions, see Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War,
Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1259–60 (2002) (criticizing
administration’s approach).
78. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 34–35, 54 (stating that recruiters, trainers,
financiers, and weapons providers should be protected from targeting except for times when
they directly participate in hostilities); cf. Watkin, Opportunity Lost, supra note 17, at 643–44
(describing ICRC’s guidance as a proposed change in the law).
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III. UTILITARIANS AND PROTECTIVE THEORISTS
The issues prompted by the rise of non-state actors in armed
conflicts have attracted two very different normative and descriptive
outlooks. One is utilitarian, while the other I call protective. I discuss
each in turn.
A. The Utilitarian View
The hallmark of utilitarian approaches to LOAC is a reliance on
concrete reciprocity as the glue holding together the normative
framework.79 When a party can retaliate for another party’s wrongs—
for example, the killing of captives—utilitarians believe that law will
accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number. However,
utilitarians deride more diffuse brands of reciprocity that supplant
specific retaliation with a broader commitment to habits of deliberation.
For utilitarians, these intangible commitments are at best pie in the sky,
80
and at worst a dangerous distraction.
79. See Eric A. Posner, Terrorism and the Laws of War, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 423, 427–30
(2005) (focusing on prospects for enforcing IHL); see also James D. Morrow, The Institutional
Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties, 55 INT’L ORG. 971, 979–80 (2001) (considering the
role of culture and governance as well as reciprocity); cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND, supra note 20, at 158–59 (deriding much of human rights law as unenforceable
because of absence of reciprocity); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON
58 (2009) (invoking Bentham’s utilitarian skepticism about courts as mediating institutions).
80. The utilitarian treatment of the measured American response to the Cuban Missile
Crisis is illustrative. The United States decided on a blockade, rather than an all-out attack
recommended by senior military officers, in part because of Attorney General Robert
Kennedy’s view, ultimately shared by President Kennedy, that the latter course would have
lowered the United States’ reputation. See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A
MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 31 (1969) (recounting Kennedy’s passing a note to
his brother, the President, after listening to arguments for an air attack on Cuba, that said, “I
now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor”); cf. Peter Margulies, When to
Push the Envelope: Legal Ethics, the Rule of Law, and National Security Strategy, 30
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 642, 670–72 (2007) (analyzing American response to missile crisis). The
utilitarian account discounted reputational costs and efforts at minimizing violations of
international law as drivers of the United States approach and stressed the role of American
concessions to Russia, including shutting down a base in Turkey. See GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra note 20, at 178. The utilitarian approach described here is merely one brand
of utilitarianism, which other scholars have deployed to address intangible benefits that
accrue to states through compliance with international law. See GUZMAN, supra note 36, at
212–13 (focusing on role of reputation in ensuring compliance); cf. WALZER, supra note 38, at
247–50 (suggesting that “supreme emergency” justified Britain’s bombing of German
population centers while outcome of World War II and Britain’s survival were in doubt);
Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 40–55 (2010)
(suggesting that IHL, after incorporating appropriate institutional and substantive safeguards
that considered intangible costs, should recognize “necessity” as basis for violating norms, for
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Utilitarians’ embrace of concrete reciprocity and their wariness of
intangible incentives for compliance dovetails with two related
attributes: deference to leaders of strong democracies, such as the
United States, that have the military might to retaliate and skepticism
about constraints imposed on those leaders by domestic or international
81
law. Utilitarians believe that powerful states and those who run them
will promote the general welfare over time, while non-state actors will
only hinder beneficial state efforts and, in so doing, exacerbate
82
collective-action problems that only powerful states can manage.
Unfortunately, utilitarians fail to appreciate that the absence of
constraints on states also destabilizes LOAC.
Utilitarians have some distinct advantages. First, they have a
83
methodological toolkit that includes concepts like signaling, collective84
85
Second, their substantive
action problems, and path dependence.
concerns are perennial issues in LOAC that have only become more
pressing with time. Excusing violent non-state actors from compliance
with rules governing the wearing of insignia, for example, can lead to
more violence, just as utilitarians predict in mourning reciprocity’s
86
declining relevance.
However, utilitarians concerned that asymmetries favor terrorists,
have tacked to the other extreme in granting strong states too much
leeway. In the process, utilitarians misplace their methodological
toolkit. Distrusting external constraints, utilitarians place excessive trust

example, when officials were reasonably certain that only torture of suspected terrorist could
save thousands of lives).
81. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 20, at 64–65, 158–59
(expressing skepticism about both domestic judicial review and countries’ adherence to
international law).
82. See id. at 159 (warning about “[a]dvocates of world constitutionalism”).
83. See id. at 123 (observing that through “institutional mechanisms that impose heavier
costs on ill-motivated actors than on well-motivated ones, the well-motivated executive can
credibly signal his good intentions and thus persuade voters” who cannot independently
research the issues); cf. POSNER, supra note 35, at 18–27 (discussing signaling in legal,
commercial, and personal relationships).
84. See Posner, Welfarist Approach, supra note 9, at 495–99 (arguing that humanitarian
intervention is often difficult because each country regards human rights elsewhere as public
goods that offer no concrete benefit).
85. See VERMEULE, supra note 79, at 108–10 (criticizing path-dependence in common
law caused when atypical facts form backdrop for decision).
86. Cf. Posner, supra note 79, at 433–34 (discussing difficulty of reaching agreement with
Al Qaeda on ground rules for conflict because of lack of reciprocity and symmetry).
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in policymakers’ prudence.87 Crises have a habit of making prudence
seem expendable, as officials demonstrated in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11 by seeking drastic modifications of IHL rules regarding
88
detention, interrogation, and trial. Receiving such unsettling signals,
more cautious officials and other stakeholders such as the courts and the
89
Citing the path dependence that
military redressed the balance.
utilitarians criticize in other contexts, one of the officials who pushed
back in these debates has suggested that the executive’s unilateral
moves immediately after 9/11 produced a backlash that less extreme
90
initial decisions could have controlled. In sum, utilitarians—so adept at
87. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 20, at 174
(discussing the executive’s advantages in foreign affairs).
88. See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS
LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 2–3 (2007); RANETA LAWSON MACK & MICHAEL J. KELLY,
EQUAL JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE: AMERICA’S LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE EMERGING
TERRORIST THREAT 2–3 (2004); cf. MARGULIES, supra note 5, at 36–42 (discussing coercive
interrogation).
89. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (striking down legislation that
purported to limit federal courts’ jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus brought by
detainees); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006) (holding that President Bush could
not unilaterally establish military commissions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509–10
(2004) (holding that Congress’ passage of Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) after September 11, 2001, that authorized detention of presumptive United States
citizen apprehended in Afghanistan violated due process safeguards); cf. MARGULIES, supra
note 5, at 63, 159–60 (detailing the roles of Jack Goldsmith, who withdrew aggressive opinions
written by John Yoo of Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, and of State
Department officials such as John Bellinger, Matthew Waxman, and Philip Zelikow who
fought against the continuation of coercive interrogations); OSIEL, supra note 7, at 342–45
(discussing role of military lawyers in contesting policies on interrogation); Gregory S.
McNeal, Organizational Culture, Professional Ethics and Guantánamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 125, 129–34 (2009) (discussing culture of opposition to political influence within
military). But see Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military:
A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1820–23 (2007)
(criticizing dissent by military officials as posing tension with civilian control).
90. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 43, at 139 (arguing that if executive had complied with
minimal Geneva Convention requirements in the twenty months after September 11, it would
have “avoided the more burdensome procedural . . . requirements that became practically
necessary under the pressure of subsequent judicial review”); cf. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER
AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 117–78 (2012)
(observing that revelations about abuses by U.S. personnel at Abu Ghraib in April, 2004,
influenced U.S. Supreme Court decisions curbing executive power). The executive’s role has
been contested since the Founding Era; sources consulted by the Framers often favored a
more modest role than the one suggested by either utilitarian commentators or subsequent
practice. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689
(2008) (examining Founding Era interpretations of the role of a “commander in chief”); cf.
David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 501–05 (2008)
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discerning free riding in others—are free riders in disguise, coveting the
prudence that constraints promote in others while rejecting those
constraints themselves.
B. The Protective Paradigm
Unlike the utilitarian view, the protective model regards concrete
reciprocity as woefully inadequate as a basis for enforceable norms.
Protective theorists rightly acknowledge that more diffuse incentives,
including a commitment to justice, are necessary for core LOAC goals
91
However,
like establishing a floor for the treatment of captives.
protective theorists’ fervor for imposing constraints on states typically
92
exceeds their commitment to constraining violent non-state actors.
This asymmetry threatens to destabilize LOAC and enhance risks for
civilians.
A strength of the protective approach is that it provides an ironclad
approach to state obligations once an adversary is in state custody.
Advocates of the protective paradigm note that all detainees, including
those allegedly from non-state actors such as Al Qaeda, are entitled to
the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention,
including the right to be free from torture and the right to trial with
93
appropriate procedural safeguards. Any other result would create a
gap favoring states’ use of harsh tactics that might appear expedient in
the short run, but that would ultimately erode the credibility of a party
to a conflict. The protective model is also correct that continued
detention of alleged members of Al Qaeda requires ongoing review of a
94
No theorist of the protective
detainee’s current dangerousness.
(noting that, by the time of the framing, political and military leadership were often
divorced).
91. See Jelena Pejic, “Unlawful/Enemy Combatants:” Interpretations and Consequences,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 39, at 335, 348; cf. OSIEL, supra
note 7, at 368–69 (arguing for a more diffuse form of reciprocity that hinges on maintaining
the system of international law).
92. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 53 & n.123 (placing limits on state targeting
of violent non-state actors such as bomb makers); Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between
Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831,
865–66 (2010) (defending the ICRC’s guidance limits on targeting non-state actors, “one
causal step” removed from direct hostilities, by comparison to contractors hired by state
actors).
93. See Pejic, supra note 91, at 339; cf. Bellinger & Padmanabhan, supra note 4, at 233–
36 (discussing continuing issues regarding detention).
94. See Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and International Law
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approach could ever trivialize legal advice approving coercive
95
interrogation, as utilitarian theorists have done.
However, protective theorists who eagerly speak truth to state
power are less interested in addressing the proclivities of violent nonstate actors. Portions of Additional Protocol I give those using arms
against “colonial domination and . . . racist regimes” leeway to reject
wearing identifiable insignia. The drafters of Additional Protocol I
made this move even though traditional groups of partisans, like Tito’s
guerillas in World War II Yugoslavia, were able to operate effectively
by generally complying with a broader version of the insignia
96
requirement. Protective theorists also pushed for the ICRC changes
that allowed violent non-state actors with key combat roles to claim
immunity from targeting at most places and times, while subjecting state
forces to continuous risk.
in the United States, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 135, 148–49 (2008) (criticizing Bush
administration’s minimalist framework for administrative review of Guantanamo detention).
One can also read Rona as questioning whether a state has any power to detain civilians
participating in terrorism outside of detention for those awaiting deportation or trial. See id.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, Guantanamo detainees
now are entitled to habeas corpus to determine, at the very least, whether they were at the
point of capture part of Al Qaeda or associated forces. The Obama administration also has
fashioned a more robust administrative process to determine current dangerousness and
assess the point-of-capture status of detainees in Afghanistan and elsewhere. See Al Alwi v.
Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding detention of individual who had
received training in Al Qaeda camp and joined Taliban combat unit); see also Al Maqaleh v.
Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that U.S. district courts lacked jurisdiction
over detainees in Afghanistan); cf. Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military
Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 770–71 (2011) (analyzing continued
questions about scope of habeas authority); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in
Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 53–55 (2009) (stating that the law of war permits
detention of civilians indirectly assisting combatant groups); Matthew C. Waxman,
Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, 17–23 (2009) (reviewing the possibility of flexibility in administrative
detention).
95. See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Op-Ed., A ‘Torture’ Memo and Its Tortuous
Critics, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2004, at A22 (describing aggressive legal memos as “standard
lawyerly fare, routine stuff”).
96. See Schmitt, supra note 52, at 405. In World War II, allied forces worked closely
with partisan fighters who often, but not always, wore identifying items of clothing such as
armbands. Pushing the insignia envelope in this fashion poses a tension with traditional
LOAC requirements. However, World War II partisans used this tactic primarily to target
strategic objectives such as factories and rail lines. Indeed, such attacks were often more
precise than the aerial attacks also used by allied forces against the Axis powers, and resulted
in fewer civilian casualties, thus promoting the principle of distinction. See W. Hays Parks,
Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 493, 526–36 (2003). Using
disguise to facilitate lethal force against opposing forces or civilians is far more problematic.
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More to the point, the protective theorists’ focus on curbing states
reflects an idealized version of warfare that does not match present-day
challenges. In an otherwise thoughtful piece, one commentator
revealed this skewed vision by offering the example of insurgents’ attack
97
on a military base. The commentator’s nominal point—that insurgent
attacks on military targets should not, without more, be labeled as
98
terrorism —was undoubtedly correct. However, the use of this
particular example was telling. States, particularly strong democracies
such as the United States, would be in a fortunate position if the violent
groups they have confronted in recent years limited themselves to
straightforward attacks on military installations. However, organized
armed groups have rarely accepted such limits. More often, they have
used disguise to get close to a military target in a fashion that violates
LOAC, as the Lebanese group Hezbollah did in its 1983 suicide car99
bomb attack on the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. Or they have
used disguise to facilitate the use of indiscriminate lethal force against
civilians, as the 9/11 attackers did. Terrorist networks also embed their
100
infrastructure within civilian arenas to avoid retaliation. While giving
conventional insurgents “incentive[s] . . . to respect international
101
humanitarian law” is a plausible project, the same enterprise seems
quixotic when a group’s business plan entails wholesale rejection of
102
LOAC norms. Idealized examples do little to help the victims of such
groups’ tactics.
Protective theorists’ lack of realism about terrorist networks extends
to their proposals for addressing the threat posed by Al Qaeda’s ability
to move across borders. For protective theorists, criminal prosecution is
103
104
not merely an important tool, it is the only game in town. Protective
97. See Pejic, supra note 91, at 353–54.
98. Id. at 354.
99. See William C. Banks, A Second Nuclear Age?, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 429, 431
(2007).
100. See Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare? Part I: Defender Duties
Under International Humanitarian Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 425, 431–37 (2011) (arguing that
viewed ex ante, unduly rigid restraints on governments defending civilians from terrorist
groups enhance incentives for terrorists to plan attacks and conceal themselves within civilian
populations).
101. Pejic, supra note 91, at 354.
102. Doubts about the prospects of enticing terrorist networks into the IHL fold do not,
however, justify states’ abandonment of IHL norms. Id. (noting applicability of Geneva
Common Article 3 protections against torture and unfair trials).
103. See James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the
Federal Courts: 2009 Update and Recent Developments, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 267, 267–
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theorists also often view human rights law as paramount, even when
105
tribunals and scholars have viewed IHL as occupying the field. Core
norms are the same in both bodies of law regarding the treatment of
106
detainees, but they vary widely regarding state targeting options. The
human rights domain generally contemplates the arrest of lawbreakers,
107
The use of lethal force against a
including suspected terrorists.
suspected terrorist would under human rights law be an extrajudicial
execution. When conflict reaches a particular level of intensity,
however, requiring the arrest of a fighter and a disposition in a civilian
court is impracticable under human rights law.
Protective theorists also, with greater acuity, seek to limit both the
geographic scope of armed conflicts and the encroachment on other
sovereign states of targeting efforts. For protective theorists, noninternational armed conflicts should by definition stay within the
108
Moreover, targeting terrorist
territorial confines of a single state.
networks in any other state should require that state’s consent. Limits
of this kind arguably minimize civilian casualties, given that any lawful
targeting can include collateral damage to civilians, as long as that
damage is proportionate to the military objective achieved. Such limits
also protect sovereign prerogatives. However, both of these claims are
contestable. Terrorist networks that set up camps in adjacent or remote
countries do so to facilitate further attacks on civilians in countries that
109
oppose them. Moreover, remote camps also endanger local civilians,
particularly because terrorists frequently kill those they suspect of

68, 270 (2009) (concluding that federal courts can try suspected terrorists efficiently); see also
Prosecuting Terrorists; Civilian and Military Trials for GTMO and Beyond: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. On Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 24 (2009) (remarks of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I.) (same).
104. See O’Connell, supra note 76, at 11 (arguing that drone attacks coordinated by
intelligence agents violate international law); see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on
Targeted Killings, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (same).
105. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8); DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 13, at 23–25;
Schmitt, supra note 4, at 821.
106. See DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 13, at 24.
107. See O’Connell, supra note 76, at 26.
108. See id. at 25–26 (evaluating Pakistan’s role in U.S. drone attacks on its citizens).
109. See Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A
“Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L.
REV. 46, 66 (2009).
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disloyalty or lack of cooperation.110 Sovereign states unable or unwilling
to control terrorist camps within their borders have failed a crucial test
of sovereignty, namely preventing harm to other states emanating from
their territory. In the face of these concerns, the protective argument
seems less like a sustainable principle, and more like a fear of slippery
slopes that can be addressed through appropriate safeguards.
IV. A STRUCTURAL VIEW OF LOAC
The difficulties of the utilitarian and protective approaches suggest
the need for a structural approach. While utilitarians view unilateral
state action as necessary and protective theorists see NGOs as the
starting point for innovation, a structural view would look to the
sustainability of initiatives rather than their origin. On this account,
111
Level 1 features
changes in LOAC result from a two-level game.
dialogue and debate among domestic institutions, including the
112
Level 2 includes
executive branch, the military, and the courts.
interaction among strong states and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). Utilitarians tend to believe that both games should be over
before they start, as state leaders elbow out other domestic institutions
and face down transnational interlopers. Protective theorists have their
110. See Lorna McGregor, Beyond the Time and Space of Peace Talks: Re-Appropriating
the Peace Process in Sri Lanka, 11 INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 39, 45 (2006) (noting that as of 2006,
Tamil Tigers (LTTE) of Sri Lanka continued to “assassinate its political opponents, extort
taxes, recruit children into its forces, [and] attack the Muslim community within the territory
it controls”); see also Erica Chenoweth et al., Correspondence: What Makes Terrorists Tick,
INT’L SECURITY, Spring 2009, at 180, 185 (noting that LTTE sought dominance among Tamils
through killing of members of rival factions); cf. Algeria Tries to Avert Terrorism During
Ramadan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1997, at A3 (discussing violence by terrorist groups against
civilians, as well as government violence in response); Michael Humphrey, Violence, Voice
and Identity in Algeria, 22 ARAB. STUD. Q. 1, 6 (2000) (same).
111. See Putnam, supra note 24, at 436; see also Joel P. Trachtman, International Law
and Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law,
11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 127, 131–34 (2010) (discussing role of domestic politics in state compliance
with international law, although leaving aside other institutions such as courts).
112. Students of comparative politics recognize that domestic constituencies can alter
foreign policy in unexpected ways. For example, consider the tendency toward irredentism in
post-Iron Curtain Eastern Europe, in which states freed from Soviet domination wished to
reunite with members of the state’s dominant ethnic group in neighboring states. Irredentism
can give rise to bitter violence. However, a countervailing factor is the dominant group’s fear
of immigrants, who could include their fellow ethnics, as well as other members of the second
state’s population. Political leaders who would otherwise take their country into war over
irredentist sentiment must consider this opposing position. See STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN & R.
WILLIAM AYRES, FOR KIN OR COUNTRY: XENOPHOBIA, NATIONALISM, AND WAR 40–41
(2008).
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own form of tunnel vision: they see the Level 2 game as a one-way
affair, with NGOs gradually weaning impulsive states from their
113
irresponsible ways.
A structural account would stress that LOAC changes occur because
the games are fluid and interoperative, with domestic institutions like
courts and the military learning from NGOs. Similarly, NGOs must
accommodate unified state positions. Changes in law can start from
either level.
New norms can crystallize through state practices with subsequent
ratification by an international body. Consider the intervention in
Kosovo by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). NATO’s action was problematic under positive international
law because the United Nations Security Council had not approved
114
NATO’s campaign, and NATO’s members did not act in self115
defense. Some NGOs criticized the intervention on these grounds or
116
as leading to disproportionate deaths among civilians. However, other
117
After the conclusion of NATO’s
NGOs praised NATO’s move.
113. Putnam is ambivalent on this point. Compare Putnam, supra note 24, at 429–30
(discussing “policy shift being demanded of . . . [the] country internationally”), with id. at
435–36 (acknowledging that in bilateral negotiations between United States and another
country, each side plays the two-level game). Liberal and constructivist theories of
international law tend to be unidirectional in tone if not substance, stressing how
transnational actors such as NGOs can influence the policies of the United States and other
nations. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 897 (1998); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 639–43
(2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2602–03 (1997) (book review).
114. See U.N. Charter art. 53.
115. See Id. art. 2, para. 4. Critics of humanitarian intervention argued that it would
multiply regional conflicts and provide a cover for aggression by stronger countries. See
Louis Henkin, Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT
CENTURY 383, 400 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994). The State
Department’s Legal Adviser did not assert that international law authorized the intervention
in Kosovo, but found that the decision was “justifiable and legitimate” in light of the
circumstances. See David R. Andrews, The Clinton Administration—David R. Andrews
(1997–2000), in SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 113, 125 (Michael
P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams eds., 2010).
116. Cf. Sloane, supra note 59, at 50–51 (expressing concerns about Kosovo campaign).
But see Schmitt, supra note 4, at 823 (arguing that use of precision-targeting technology
alleviated concerns).
117. See Judith Miller, NATO’s War Aims; The Test: Getting the Refugees Home, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/25/weekinreview/the-world-nato-swar-aims-the-test-getting-the-refugees-home.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
(quoting
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campaign, the Security Council endorsed the terms that Serbia had
118
The Security Council’s measure, which required the
accepted.
approval of permanent members such as Russia that had initially
opposed the intervention, in effect ratified NATO’s efforts. While some
continued to view NATO’s action as illegal, others viewed it as justified
by the exigencies of the situation.
Scholars and international
organizations argued that the intervention heralded recognition of
nations’ “responsibility to protect” vulnerable minorities from mass
119
violence.
The two-level game can predict which initiatives from either source
prosper, while others wither on the vine. State initiatives in a utilitarian
vein that lack domestic institutional support at Level 1 will trigger
unified NGO opposition at Level 2, failing the test of sustainability. The
converse applies for NGOs’ protective initiatives, which need support
from Level 1 stakeholders. Without such support, they encounter
unified opposition from strong states and yield fragmentation among
NGOs. Contests at both levels hinge on two elements displayed to
varying degrees by states, NGOs, and armed non-state actors: linear
time horizons and holistic signaling.
A. Linear Time Horizon
While the horizon in humans’ sight is fixed by the laws of nature and
perspective, individuals’ time horizon reveals alarming discontinuities.
Perceptions of time display pervasive flaws in human inference and
120
judgment. Chronic cognitive myopia, sometimes called presentism, is
director of Physicians for Human Rights as asserting that failure to protect refugees from
Kosovo conflict might discourage future “intervention to save peoples’ [sic] lives”).
118. See S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (calling for “rapid”
and “complete” Serbian withdrawal).
119. See Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect,
24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 703, 713–15 (2006). However, scholars tend to locate this responsibility in
the Security Council, which will often decline to act because of divergent interests among its
members. As a consequence, the legal basis for intervention absent Security Council
authorization remains uncertain. See Paul R. Williams & Meghan E. Stewart, Humanitarian
Intervention: The New Missing Link in the Fight to Prevent Crimes Against Humanity and
Genocide?, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 97, 105–06 (2007–2008). Nevertheless, a
“responsibility to protect” did become more salient in United Nations discourse and
operational practice after the Kosovo intervention. See Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through
the Operational Activities of International Organizations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 87,
94–100 (2008).
120. The following account is based on material in an earlier article. See Peter
Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the
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a constant of the human condition: people fixate on short-term factors
121
and neglect the long-term. Perceptions of time track the vantage point
of the self-absorbed New Yorker in the Saul Steinberg cartoon: the gap
between today and tomorrow is huge, like the artist’s rendering of the
122
distance between New York and New Jersey. The difference between
tomorrow and next year is modest, emulating the cartoon’s depiction of
New Jersey as virtually next door to the Pacific Ocean. In other words,
people’s temporal discounting function is higher than it should be, with
the present getting a disproportionate share of attention.
Some social scientists have refined this model, positing that
individuals suffer from “projection bias.” In other words, people view
current tastes as fixed, underestimating how their tastes will change in
123
the future. When a salient or visceral factor, such as hunger, shapes
one’s current preferences, the individual will overestimate the duration
124
and continued dominance of this state.
Left to the perils of their flawed inferences, individuals make bad
decisions. For example, studies have shown that people will decline
even manifestly profitable investments because of wariness of relatively
125
Studies also tell us what we already know:
modest up-front costs.
people happily engage in self-destructive behaviors such as substance
126
abuse that yield short-term benefits at the price of long-term dangers.
Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 204–11 (2010).
121. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical
Review, in TIME AND DECISION, supra note 27, at 13, 32–34; see also Loewenstein & Angner,
supra note 27, at 353–54 (people tend to underestimate the degree of change between current
and future tastes, in part because they view current tastes as “objective”); Jolls et al., supra
note 26, at 45–46; Laibson, supra note 26, at 450; Streich & Levy, supra note 25, at 205; cf.
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 1449, 1457–62 (2006) (discussing saving and consumption patterns); Nira Liberman &
Yaacov Trope, Construal Level Theory of Intertemporal Judgment and Decision, in TIME AND
DECISION, supra note 27, at 245, 247–56 (discussing distortions in intertemporal judgment).
122. See Jeanne English Sullivan, Copyright for Visual Art in the Digital Age: A Modern
Adventure in Wonderland, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 563, 616–17 (1996) (describing
Steinberg’s cartoon as depiction of New Yorkers’ myopic view of the world).
123. See Loewenstein & Angner, supra note 27, at 372–73.
124. Id. at 370–73.
125. See James J. Choi et al., $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(k)
Plans, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 748, 761 (2011) (noting that large cohort of people fail to
allocate optimal amount to retirement plans, despite availability of employer match and
significant increase in size of asset and that most members of this cohort reveal comparable
patterns for other assets and decisions).
126. See, e.g., Drazen Prelec, Decreasing Impatience: A Criterion for Non-stationary
Time Preference and “Hyperbolic” Discounting, 106 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 511, 513 (2004)
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Indeed, as the substance abuse example reveals, sometimes even
calculating costs a couple of hours in the future, such as the risks of
driving while intoxicated, can overload humans’ tattered temporal
judgment.
127
People can remedy these flaws, but only with conscious planning.
Just as the Greek hero Ulysses had his crew bind him to the mast so he
128
could resist the sirens’ serenade and continue his journey, people
fashion devices that correct for flaws in temporal judgment. For
example, financial planners tell people to set up savings accounts and
diversify their portfolios. The purchase of insurance is another hedge
that entails people binding themselves in the present to stave off longterm harms. Moreover, presentism is less pronounced in practice and in
neural imaging when subjects make decisions on behalf of others, rather
129
Vicarious decisionmaking apparently reduces the
than themselves.
emotional content of such decisions, leaving more space for
deliberation. This finding suggests that a proxy decisionmaker, at least
one without a competing agenda, may better balance present and future
costs and benefits.
Because human inference is a creature of both anticipation and
memory, distortions in the time horizon also affect perspectives on the
130
past. People impute current knowledge to past selves, producing what
cognitive psychologists call hindsight bias. Because of hindsight bias,
people overstate the probability that a party could have prevented a
131
particular harm. Vivid harms color assessment of the acts or omissions
(explaining procrastination).
127. See Laibson, supra note 26, at 444.
128. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 36 (1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140–45 (1986).
129. See Konstanze Albrecht et al., What Is for Me Is Not for You: Brain Correlates of
Intertemporal Choice for Self and Other, 6 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE
218, 218, 224 (2011).
130. See Loewenstein & Angner, supra note 27, at 372.
131. See Fischhoff, supra note 27, at 342 (“Consider decision makers who have been
caught unprepared by some turn of events and who try to see where they went wrong . . . . If,
in retrospect, the event appears to have seemed relatively likely, they can do little more than
berate themselves for not taking the action that their knowledge seems to have dictated.”);
see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 26, at 95, 95 (stating that maxims such as
“hindsight . . . is ‘20/20’” indicate that “[l]earning how the story ends . . . [distorts] our
perception of what could have been predicted”); Neal J. Roese, Twisted Pair: Counterfactual
Thinking and the Hindsight Bias, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING, supra note 26, at 258, 260–61 (hindsight bias is “the tendency to believe that an
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preceding the harm.132 This “anchoring” of perceptions to vivid past
133
events has broader implications for human inference. When a referee
at an athletic event sees a player throw a punch, for example, the referee
is likely to infer that the player he saw commit the offense bears
responsibility for the altercation. In fact, however, that player’s punch
134
could have been the culmination of interactions throughout the game.
Maintaining the habits of deliberation that accompany a linear time
horizon has always been central to the laws of war. While leaders and
thinkers have agreed for millennia that war may sometimes be
necessary, observance of LOAC can cultivate the habits of
135
In contrast, the
“moderation” that eventually make peace possible.
failure to observe these rules usually heralds a conflict of wider scope
and longer duration.
The law on surrender illustrates the importance of rules in fostering
habits of dialogue and deliberation. The law of war has long prohibited
event was predictable before it occurred, even though for the perceiver it was not”).
132. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Governance, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 26, at 567, 575–76
[hereinafter Rachlinski, Heuristics and Governance].
133. On anchoring, see Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Anchoring, Activation,
and the Construction of Values, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 115, 144 (1999); Daniel Kahneman et al., Economic Preferences or Attitude
Expressions? An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES 642, 665–68 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); cf. Florian Fessel &
Neal J. Roese, Hindsight Bias, Visual Aids, and Legal Decision Making: Timing Is Everything,
5 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 180, 181 (2011) (noting that because of
hindsight bias, individual who learned that colleague had been fired would remember events
that were consistent with this fact, such as colleague’s lateness, as opposed to neutral or
inconsistent data, such as positive evaluations or customer good will); Rachlinski, Heuristics
and Governance, supra note 132, at 569 (noting significant increase in subjects’ perceived
need to take precautions once researchers told subjects that flood with 10% likelihood of
occurrence in given year had actually happened).
134. For an intriguing study of officiating in sports and its relevance to judgments in law,
see Mitchell N. Berman, “Let ‘Em Play”: A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, 99 GEO. L.J.
1325, 1330–31 (2011), which supports a meta-rule that would discourage calling fouls late in
basketball games and that would rely more on course of dealing among players; see also W.
Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental
and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 300 (1998) (discussing the problem of hindsight bias in
juries). But see CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED
DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 3–4 (2001) (arguing that jury verdicts
in product liability cases are not excessive); cf. Fischhoff, supra note 27, at 348 (noting the
tendency of historians to assemble tidy narratives, “with all the relevant details neatly
accounted for and the uncertainty surrounding the event prior to its consummation
summarily buried”).
135. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667 (1863).
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killing captives in large part because the short-term expedients that
drive this extreme measure can have dire long-term consequences. As
one commentator noted centuries ago: “Should the sovereign conceive
he has a right to hang up his prisoners as rebels, the opposite party will
make reprisals . . . the war will become cruel, horrible, and every day
136
more destructive to the nation.” Customary international law, such as
the immunity of ambassadors and the inviolability of safe conduct
pledges, emerged from the same premise of promoting habits of
137
deliberation among nations.
An ex ante view that considers incentives for coordination in
138
avoiding needless violence is vital to LOAC. Changes in the law must
reflect realism about parties’ inclination and capacity to take advantage
of the incentives provided. Incentives that fail to elicit the conduct
envisioned have opportunity costs, discouraging more productive
measures. Failing to address those opportunity costs is itself a form of
temporal misjudgment.
War, like the other aspects of the political landscape well known to
the Framers, requires structures that promote pre-commitment to
thought in lieu of hasty action. The Framers understood the need to
anchor political deliberation to structure. In justifying judicial review,
Alexander Hamilton cautioned against the political branches’ tendency
139
to act on the impulses of the moment. James Madison, exhibiting an
equally refined understanding of the dangers of a distorted time
horizon, dryly observed that “indirect and remote considerations . . . will
rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in
140
disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole.” LOAC
is also an effort to prevent such distortions; as Michael Walzer aptly
141
described them, the laws of war are “constitutionalism in hell.”
Central to war’s constitutionalism are what I call identification
norms. Identification norms include jus in bello principles such as
136. Id.; see also SOLIS, supra note 49, at 8–9, 18 (discussing how soldiers who decline to
surrender and continue to fight in the face of certain defeat ratchet up violence).
137. See BELLI, supra note 48, at 81 (discussing diplomatic immunity); cf. Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723–24 (2004) (noting that diplomatic immunity was regarded
in Founding Era as a cornerstone of customary international law).
138. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 132 (quoting philosopher Henry Sidgwick on
avoiding “the danger of provoking reprisals and of causing bitterness that will long outlast”
hostilities).
139. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 28, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton).
140. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 28, at 56 (James Madison).
141. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 47.
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distinction, which requires care in distinguishing an adversary’s forces
142
Criteria for interrogation, detention, and trial of
from civilians.
members of an adversary’s forces would also fit into this category.
Rules barring coercive interrogation, for example, are necessary in part
because norms on detention and trial would be meaningless if a party
could use coercion to extract an admission that would fit whatever
143
criteria applied.
American courts have long found ways to directly or obliquely
accommodate identification norms that inform temporal judgment in
144
armed conflict. By invoking norms that required the government to
make careful determinations about persons and property subject to
seizure, the Court has ensured that short-term calculations would not
overwhelm long-term values. In a landmark early decision that set the
interpretive tone, the Court held that the executive, absent clear
direction from Congress, could not violate the law of nations by seizing
145
The Court also required that the
neutral vessels on the high seas.
executive precisely follow Congress’s instructions on the appropriate
146
time and place for seizure. In addition, the Court barred the executive
147
from seizing enemy property absent express direction from Congress.
142. See Pejic, supra note 91, at 342 (rejecting the notion of an “intermediate” category
that is neither combatant nor civilian).
143. Identification norms include not only rules governing the use of force on others, but
also criteria for how those using force should distinguish themselves. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text (discussing wearing of insignia); supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text
(discussing signaling).
144. See Golove, supra note 29, at 562–63; David Weissbrodt & Nathaniel H. Nesbitt,
The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Interpreting and Developing Humanitarian
Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1344 (2011) (noting the Supreme Court’s recognition of the law
of war shortly after the Court’s inception).
145. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 72 (1804); see also
Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 487 (1998); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth,
Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46
B.C. L. REV. 293, 302 (2005) (explaining the Charming Betsy Canon); cf. Peter Margulies,
Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure After
September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 402–06 (2004) (arguing that courts should interpret
statutes authorizing force as being consistent with international humanitarian law).
146. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804); David J. Barron & Martin
S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, supra
note 90, at 947.
147. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 115–16 (1814) (ordering relief from
official’s attempt during War of 1812 to condemn as enemy property cargo on vessel
chartered by British company); see also Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President’s Power to
Detain “Enemy Combatants”: Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison’s Forgotten War, 98 NW. U.
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In Ex parte Milligan, the Court held that United States citizens who
were not belligerents could not be tried in military commissions, at least
148
when civilian courts were open. At the turn of the twentieth century,
the Court held that customary international law barred seizure of
149
In
coastal fishing vessels typically used by civilians for subsistence.
many of these cases, the Court’s decision relied on interpretive default
rules that Congress could overcome, rather than on categorical
declarations. However, these rules still have bite because overcoming
150
inertia triggers costs that Congress is not always ready to bear.
The post-September 11 cases have continued this focus on
identification norms. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court struck down
legislation that stripped Guantanamo detainees of access to habeas
corpus, expressly citing the importance of preserving the government’s
temporal judgment from the “pendular swings” that listing from crisis to
151
crisis can yield. The Boumediene Court questioned the reliability of
L. REV. 1567, 1597–98 (2004) (discussing Brown).
148. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 106 (1866).
149. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900); cf. William S. Dodge, The Paquete
Habana: Customary International Law as Part of Our Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
STORIES 175, 195–96 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that Paquete Habana decision
reflected robust role of customary principles). Utilitarians have singled out The Paquete
Habana for special criticism, asserting that it offered a stilted and selective account of state
practices contributing to customary international law. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra
note 20, at 71–72 (asserting that Britain had attacked coastal fishing vessels during Crimean
War). But see Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 699–700 (vessels attacked by British-supplied
enemy troops and were not intended for subsistence); Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law:
National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD.
L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2008) (arguing that British attacks may have stemmed from breakdown of
discipline among British and allied forces, not policy decision).
150. See Dodge, supra note 149, at 195–96 (arguing that the Paquete Habana Court
would have been reluctant to permit unilateral executive disregard of customary principles).
See generally EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 163–65 (2008) (discussing importance of default rules that allocate
burden of overcoming legislative inertia in light of Guantanamo detainees).
151. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742, 771 (2008); cf. Martin S. Flaherty,
Constitutional Resolve in a World Changed Utterly, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 575, 578–80 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011)
(discussing robust judicial review in war on terror cases); Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without
Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165, 1183–86 (discussing importance of habeas as check on
political branches); Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in
the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 301, 303–05 (2009) (arguing that judicially imposed
rules are necessary to compensate for short-sighted executive policies); Joseph Landau,
Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 661, 663–67 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court has used procedural rulings in
terrorism cases to police interaction between the branches); Stephen I. Vladeck,
Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE
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administrative processes to adjudicate a detainee’s status.152 The D.C.
Circuit’s jurisprudence on criteria for detention has required reliable
evidence that a detainee is part of Al Qaeda or associated groups,
demonstrated through proof of attendance at training camps and
association with Al Qaeda or the Taliban in maneuvers in
153
Afghanistan. Courts have held that targeting decisions by the United
154
States military are political questions. However, a case on the alleged
targeting of an American citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi, whom the
government had identified as a leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, found that the targeting presented a political question only
155
after discussion of the basis for the government’s view.
The law of war also takes hindsight bias into account. Consider the
principle of proportionality, which requires that attackers avoid
156
The
excessive collateral damage in achieving a military advantage.
principle does not specify any precise ratio of civilian deaths to military
success.
As a manual by three noted commentators observed,
“[P]roportionality is not an exact science and it is impossible to draw in
DAME L. REV. 2107, 2125–35 (2009) (discussing historical background for judicial review).
But see Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, in THE SUPREME COURT
REVIEW 225, 225–27 (2010) (questioning impact of post-September 11 court decisions
regarding national security measures); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War
on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1015–17 (2008) (same).
152. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 784 (noting that, in an administrative process, “the
detainee’s opportunity to question witnesses is likely to be more theoretical than real”).
153. See Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 13–14, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding
detention of individual who had received training in Al Qaeda camp and joined Taliban
combat unit); Chesney, Who May Be Held?, supra note 94, at 845–47; Matthew C. Waxman,
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1411–12 (2008); see also BENJAMIN WITTES, DETENTION AND
DENIAL: THE CASE FOR CANDOR AFTER GUANTÁNAMO 143–44 (2011) (arguing for
codification of detention policy); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1087–89
(2008) (discussing dialectic between fairness and efficiency in models of adjudication). But
see Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving
Beyond the Armed Conflict–Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369, 411–12 (2008) (arguing
that administrative detention should be permissible, but that conduct such as participation in
a training camp does not constitute a sufficiently serious threat to justify detention).
154. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 559 F.3d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
155. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010) (describing
government’s view that al-Aulaqi had been complicit in the shooting of military personnel at
Fort Hood and other recent terrorist plots). The court also found, in ruling that al-Aulaqi’s
father lacked standing, that the alleged target had an adequate opportunity to come forward
to contest the government’s claims. See id. at 17; cf. Chesney, supra note 45, at 8–11
(analyzing Al-Aulaqi).
156. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, arts. 52, 57.
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advance hard and fast rules.”157 Moreover, while the principle requires
an attacker to act consistently with “reasonable expectations,” it does
not fault an attacker when a military success turns out to be less
sweeping than planned or damage exceeds diligent estimates. Only a
viewer infected with hindsight bias would penalize attackers because the
“‘fog of war’” caused a disparity between reasonable expectations and
158
often unpredictable outcomes.
B. Holistic Signaling
Institutions that promote sound temporal judgment would be of
little use without the means to communicate those judgments to others.
159
In a world of imperfect information and faulty inference, each party
relies on signals that provide otherwise unavailable information about
160
Signaling is
the other’s specific intentions and general dispositions.
particularly important when a party wants to convey sincerity to others,
161
either to promote a common enterprise or avoid a conflict. Signaling
that is misunderstood or deceptive undermines common projects and
162
prompts needless friction. The fluid nature and high stakes of armed
conflicts combine to make signaling crucial.
157. SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.1.1.4 cmt. 5.
158. Id. at cmt. 4. Of course proportionality also acknowledges the risk of myopia; its
central purpose is to ensure that attackers weigh apparent strategic or tactical advantages
against cost to innocents. In the heat of battle, decisionmakers may pay less attention to the
latter concern, which is why the principle is necessary.
159. See James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Explaining Interethnic Cooperation, 90
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 715, 718–19 (1996) (noting that on local level members of one ethnic
group usually have ample informal sources for information about those from the same group
but little information about members of other groups, making cooperation difficult).
160. See POSNER, supra note 35, at 18–20; Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount
Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 674–75 (2001) (book
review).
161. For example, a sincere exchange of conciliatory gestures between two warring
factions can help each develop a shared stake in the design and operation of governing
institutions. See Matthew Hoddie & Caroline Hartzell, Signals of Reconciliation: InstitutionBuilding and the Resolution of Civil Wars, 7 INT’L STUD. REV. 21, 35 (2005) (acknowledging
that beneficial spiral results only when parties share desire for reconciliation).
162. See Robert Jervis, Deterrence and Perception, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1982/1983,
at 3, 6–7 (suggesting that Germany and Japan both misunderstood signals sent by allied
powers before World War II, and that allied powers did not consider how their signals would
be perceived); John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International
Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of
State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1, 94–95 (1997) (noting that misunderstood signals can
produce spiraling tensions between nations, as when one country conducts naval exercises
which another interprets as an aggressive move—when the second country acts against the
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Signals come in two varieties: transactional or holistic.
A
transactional signal seeks to provide information to another party about
a particular situation. In contrast, a holistic signal, while it may arise in
a particular context, tries to convey information about the underlying
habits and dispositions of the sender. In LOAC, both kinds of signals
are necessary.
As an example of a transactional signal, consider the white flag of
surrender. A fighter who flies the white flag is signaling that he will
forego hostilities in exchange for being captured instead of being killed.
If parties to an armed conflict did not recognize this signal, the attacking
party would lack the reassurance that it needs to stop its attack.
Moreover, the white flag of surrender is what theorists call a “costly
163
signal.” The sender incurs opportunity costs, because flying the white
flag requires that the sender simultaneously give up the chance to kill
more of his opponents. Incurring this cost is a token of the sender’s
164
The receiver, who in the heat of battle cannot conduct a
sincerity.
more extended analysis of the sender’s sincerity, accepts the white flag
as a proxy.
Holistic signaling does not hinge on reciprocity in a narrow sense,
but rather on a party’s recognition that it participates in a system of
165
While transactional signaling is bilateral in
shared understandings.
nature, holistic signaling is multilateral. A party may not benefit from
holistic signaling in the short term, if its adversary in an armed conflict
does not reciprocate. For example, Al Qaeda would not hesitate to
harm captives, even if the United States at all times refrained from
doing so. In the real world, however, no conflict is ever purely bilateral.
Failure to comply with LOAC yields externalities, as a state’s reputation
166
declines. Multilateral implications are rife in global counterterrorism
perceived aggression, the first country must retaliate).
163. See James D. Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus
Sinking Costs, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 68, 69–71 (1997) (arguing that leaders signal their
resolve to enemy states by upping the ante with their base, for example by making statements
such as “[t]his will not stand” that would trigger discredit if leader backs down).
164. This principle has long antecedents: Cicero extolled the duty to keep agreements
with the enemy and to avoid deceptions such as using a spy to poison an enemy leader. See
BELLI, supra note 48, at 88.
165. See OSIEL, supra note 7, at 384–86; Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 113, at 897;
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 113, at 642.
166. See GUZMAN, supra note 36, at 212–13; Christopher J. Borgen, Hearts and Minds
and Laws: Legal Compliance and Diplomatic Persuasion, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 774–78
(2009); David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 879, 879, 881–82 n.17 (2003).
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efforts. A state combating terrorism needs allies in the ranks of foreign
leaders, transnational organizations, and global publics.
Holistic
167
signaling yields benefits in this more spacious arena.
Major state players, such as the United States, signal not only their
own dispositions but their commitment to the overall LOAC
framework. This systemic signaling has been a cornerstone of American
law since the Founding Era. The Constitution expressly empowers
168
Congress to make laws defining violations of the law of nations and
169
Congress in 1789
courts to hear cases involving foreign diplomats.
granted federal courts jurisdiction over torts in violation of the law of
170
The Supreme Court during this period adopted a canon of
nations.
interpretation to avoid conflicts between legislation and international
171
These measures went far beyond the narrowly instrumental
law.
172
calculations of those who wished to avoid foreign entanglements. The
chief players of the Founding Era also saw the United States, with its
distinctive system of judicial review, as a model for governance with
173
global impact. American innovations that won approval from global
audiences could exert a positive influence on customary international
law, while heedless decisions could adversely affect the progress of selfgovernance. By publicly practicing habits of deliberation, the United
States sent a message to other states that cultivating such habits is
worthwhile. Later leaders like Lincoln and Roosevelt stressed the
United States’ role in promoting more equitable governance throughout
167. A state conducting counterinsurgency operations elsewhere in the world will also
often be prudent to tailor a policy to address concerns of the local population, even if IHL
does not require this accommodation. See Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on
Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1803 (2009) (discussing importance of
winning over populations in counterterrorism efforts); Philip Zelikow, Legal Policy for a
Twilight War, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 89, 95 (2007) (arguing that legal policy on interrogation
and related issues must consider need to attract and retain international allies); cf. Gabriella
Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 163, 166 (2011) (asking whether, by
virtue of its international position and ubiquitous need to persuade, the United States should
be held to higher standard).
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
169. Id. art. III, § 2.
170. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712–13 (2004).
171. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
172. Cf. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law
of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 447–48 (2011) (taking instrumental view of statute’s
purpose, while conceding that little concrete evidence of legislative intent exists).
173. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 196–97 (1963) (quoting John Adams and
James Wilson, and Thomas Paine, who compared the Constitution to examples from
antiquity, such as Greece and Rome).
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the world.174 The United States’ founding role in the United Nations
175
manifested this same intent.
Holistic signaling is in the interest of the United States today in a
more tangible respect. Because America has participated in military
intervention when nations’ commitment to the rule of law breaks down,
as in Kosovo and Libya, the United States has a vested interest in
enhancing the appeal of the global rule of law so that it can reduce calls
for its military capabilities. Moreover, American military personnel
developing relationships with their counterparts count on that
176
reputation as a crucial signal of their discipline and professionalism.
American defection from global rules—particularly those venerable
norms embedded in customary international law—therefore has ruinous
consequences not merely for the global system, but for America itself.
Because the United States has a stake in the integrity of the
177
international system, it cannot isolate the benefits it may receive from
174. Lincoln described emancipation as “an act of justice” consistent with the
“considerate judgment of mankind.” See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Emancipation Proclamation
(Jan. 1, 1863), in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28, 30 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
1953); cf. FONER, supra note 61, at 237 (noting Lincoln’s belief that emancipation was “the
last best, hope of earth”); Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of
International Human Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550, 560–95 (2008) (discussing Britain’s
special role in antebellum evolution of international law regarding slavery); see also Mark R.
Shulman, The Four Freedoms: Good Neighbors Make Good Law and Good Policy in a Time
of Insecurity, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 555–56 (2008) (discussing Franklin Roosevelt’s
articulation of freedoms to guide a post-war era, including freedom from want and freedom
from fear). America’s role as an example for the world is a durable element of popular
constitutionalism, connoting narratives that the public embraces independent of specific
judicial approval. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 24–25, 45–46 (2004) (discussing public opinion
on constitutionality of acts and Jefferson’s approval of public role in “supervising
constitutional law”); cf. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1185, 1204 (noting that, in Founding Era debate over Alien and Sedition Acts, “constitutional
meaning was hammered out informally through political contestation”); Larry Alexander &
Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1599–1615 (2005)
(book review) (analyzing arguments for and against constitutional interpretation by people
and elected officials).
175. See Bush, supra note 66, at 2388–89 (discussing the United Nations’ endorsement
with the United States and other countries of the theory of Crimes Against Peace). Indeed,
complaints about “American exceptionalism” when the United States does not ratify certain
international agreements or participate in institutions like the International Criminal Court
assume that United States participation will encourage other states to embrace these
measures. See Koh, supra note 113, at 2634.
176. See OSIEL, supra note 7, at 299, 312–14.
177. See Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1117, 1165–73 (2011) (discussing how the statute signals United States’ willingness to
cooperate with international law).
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defection, and cannot successfully free ride for long on disregard of
international norms.
Efforts to promote such free riding in a strong democracy falter
because institutions such as courts insulate holistic signaling from
178
Courts view certain IHL norms, such as the
executive whim.
179
prohibition on torture, as fundamental to their integrity.
Encroachment on those norms is a challenge to their institutional
180
These institutional concerns make courts tacit allies of
standing.
NGOs and military lawyers committed to upholding IHL.
V. STRUCTURE IN CONTEXT: TIME HORIZONS AND HOLISTIC
SIGNALING IN STATES, NON-STATE ACTORS, AND NGOS
Now that we have identified the values of linear time horizon and
holistic signaling as crucial, we can assess how players in our two-level
game fare under these elements. This Part considers states first. It
moves on to non-state actors and NGOs. After this comparison, this
Part takes up two proposed innovations: the Bush administration’s
attempt to deprive suspected terrorists of IHL protections and the
ICRC’s effort to change rules on targeting non-state actors participating
in hostilities.

178. See Trachtman, supra note 111, at 130–31 (describing “polyarchy” in domestic
players on international law); Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International
Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 210–11 (2004) (describing how disaggregated
government entities facilitate the recognition of international law in the United States). But
see Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797,
800–02 (2005) (questioning whether courts and NGOs have sufficient motivation and
cohesion to uphold IHL norms).
179. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897); R v. Warickshall, (1783)
168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B.) 235; 1 Leach 262. For more context on coercion and abuse of
prisoners and detainees, see JOHN T. PARRY, UNDERSTANDING TORTURE: LAW, VIOLENCE,
AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 142–45 (2010) (discussing Cold War interrogation tactics,
conducted with consent of senior officials); Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 265–66 (2004).
180. The Supreme Court’s trenchant observations in its war-on-terror cases demonstrate
this institutional commitment. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 609 (2006)
(noting that defendant in military commission proceeding was charged with general support
of Al Qaeda, not specific acts, such as the use of dogs to terrorize detainees, linked to both
notorious Civil War military prison commandant Henry Wirz and post-September 11
government policies); see also MARGULIES, supra note 5, at 41 (describing use of a dog in the
interrogation of Mohammed al-Qahtani); Pearlstein, Justice Stevens, supra note 22, at 1307–08
(discussing Justice Stevens’ view of military honor and best practices, based on his experience
in World War II and as a Supreme Court clerk after the war assisting Justice Wiley Rutledge
in review of cases alleging United States overreaching in that conflict).
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A. Comparing the Actors
1. States: Promise and Disappointment
It should be no surprise that on each axis states are most promising,
yet also most disappointing. States can develop institutions that protect
a linear time horizon and promote holistic signaling. However, these
advantages are not predestined; they must be earned through the
continued commitment to deliberation. Temptations to defect from that
commitment can easily diminish states’ advantages. If, as one scholar
has observed, states should enjoy a “rebuttable presumption that [they]
181
will act in accordance with international norms,” experience has
shown that state critics will often readily carry their burden of proof.
States’ initial advantage is constitutive: states by definition exist in
space and time in a way that other entities may not. A state
policymaker stands for “an entire community” that has developed over
time, not merely for an inflated snapshot of instantly aggregated
individual preferences. In states, “[o]ver a long period of time, shared
experiences and cooperative activity of many different kinds shape a
182
common life.” Even in an undemocratic regime, constituencies from
the cultural, religious, or business realms may on occasion counter the
183
narrative of the day.
Despite this promise, however, states’ track record is mixed, at best.
Consider the record of the United States during and since World War II.
On the one hand, American policy reflected unusual forbearance.
Despite entering the war because of aggression by others, the United
States complied with IHL in its treatment of POWs. This commitment
preserved the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and “notably”
contrasted with the atrocities committed against American POWs in the
184
However, other elements of American policy are
Pacific theater.
181. Schmitt, supra note 39, at 174.
182. WALZER, supra note 38, at 54. Of course, particular regimes can conduct
themselves with utter disregard for the lives of their constituents. See id. (“If no common life
exists, or if the state doesn’t defend the common life that does exist, [the state’s] own defense
may have no moral justification.”).
183. See Lionel K. McPherson, Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?, 117 ETHICS 524, 541–
42 (2007) (discussing de facto checks and balances in nondemocracies); cf. POSNER &
VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 20, at 178 (noting that even in a dictatorship,
“there will almost always be political forces the dictator(s) must be careful to reward or
appease, such as the military or security services, mass public opinion, or an elite ‘selectorate’
that influences the choice of dictators” (footnote omitted)).
184. See Morrow, supra note 79, at 990.
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murkier. While international law is still unclear, the bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki had consequences that American and other
185
Scholars have also criticized
strategists would not wish to repeat.
American rules of engagement in Vietnam as leading to unnecessary
186
The aftermath of September 11 produced yet more
civilian deaths.
187
If the United States strikes a better balance
tensions with IHL.
188
today, one should acknowledge that this turn was not automatic or
foreordained. Other regimes have also revealed a spectrum of
responses to the challenges of transnational terrorism, ranging from
189
brutality to nuance.

185. Compare Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 263 (July 8) (declining to rule out use of nuclear weapons in self-defense),
with Blum, Lesser Evil, supra note 80, at 2, 56–57 (arguing that bombings were “indisputably
war crimes” under present view of IHL, but that a carefully calibrated utilitarian test might
justify decisions if alternatives such as use of conventional bombs would have cost even more
civilian lives). On the home front, as well, American officials surrendered to myopia. See
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–18 (1944) (upholding statute that required
Japanese-Americans to leave their homes during World War II); see also Ex parte Endo, 323
U.S. 283, 285, 294–97 (1944) (helping to end internment program by holding that Congress
had not granted the government authority to detain concededly loyal Japanese-Americans);
cf. Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1934 (2003) (discussing
significance of Endo); Joseph Margulies, Evaluating Crisis Government, 40 CRIM. L. BULL.
627, 638–39 (2004) (discussing other World War II-era restrictions targeting Asian-Americans
and Pacific Islanders, including imposition of martial law in Hawaii).
186. See WALZER, supra note 38, at 188–90. The United States’ support for
authoritarian governments, typically justified on short-term pragmatic grounds, has injured its
reputation. Cf. DAN SAXON, TO SAVE HER LIFE: DISAPPEARANCE, DELIVERANCE, AND
THE UNITED STATES IN GUATEMALA 103–05 (2007) (discussing United States backing for
abusive regime in Guatemala as bastion against drug cartel); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Are We
Safer from Terrorism? No, but We Can Be, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 419, 431–32 (2010)
(arguing that United States support for authoritarian regimes in Middle East thwarted efforts
to build good will).
187. See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 7–8 (2008).
188. See Letter from David H. Petraeus, Gen., U.S. Army, to Multi-National Force-Iraq
(May 10, 2007), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/torture/2009/02/generalpetraeus-what-sets-us-apart.asp (noting crucial role of United States forces’ compliance with
legal norms).
189. Compare Jon Lee Anderson, Death of the Tiger: Sri Lanka’s Brutal Victory over Its
Tamil Insurgents, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, at 41, 47 (detailing the Sri Lankan
government’s campaign against Tamil Tigers, which cost the lives of thousands of civilians),
with Julio S. Amador III, National Security Challenges of the Philippines Under the Aquino
Administration: A Human Security Approach 7–8 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1752622 (discussing the blend of reconciliation and targeted force
used by the Philippine government against insurgents).
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2. Non-State Actors: Virtue and Vice
Non-state actors lack states’ presumptive advantages in temporal
judgment and signaling. Some non-state actors can cultivate greater
temporal and signaling capacities because they control territory and
190
seek to participate in state governance. Networks such as Al Qaeda,
which aspire to transnational reach, have fewer incentives to modify
their signaling and temporal judgment. Change is difficult for each nonstate group, however, particularly when groups start with a core strategy
of inflicting mass casualties on an adversary’s civilian population.
Both territorial groups and networks suffer from a paucity of
institutions, such as courts or an organized opposition party, that can
straighten out time horizons. Non-state actors frequently adapt secrecy
191
Secrecy can dilute checks and balances in democratic
as a strategy.
192
states and has similar effects on non-state actors. While emerging
non-state actors embrace a more transparent and interactive ideal that
193
leverages social media, groups that insisted on secrecy as a standard
operating procedure developed more monolithic institutions that
suppressed debate. Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers, for example, evolved into
194
a cult of personality that acted on a charismatic leader’s caprices. Al
Qaeda leaders function in a similar echo chamber. When secrecy skews
debate, decisionmakers view moderation as betrayal.
Targeting
moderates creates a positive feedback loop within the group that
195
exacerbates violence.
Secrecy also skews non-state actors’ signaling. A group that views
secrecy and deception as essential will ignore norms that require visible
190. See OSIEL, supra note 7, at 283; Klotz, supra note 10, at 463–64.
191. See HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 179–80.
192. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 579–80 (2d Cir. 2009) (invoking secrecy as a
distinction that may “amount to a special factor counseling hesitation” in expansion of
damages claims against government officials for extraordinary rendition).
193. See Blake Hounshell, The Revolution Will Be Tweeted: Life in the Vanguard of the
New Twitter Proletariat, FOREIGN POL’Y, July/Aug. 2011, at 20, 20.
194. See Anderson, supra note 189, at 43.
195. See Andrew H. Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, The Strategies of Terrorism, INT’L
SECURITY, Summer 2006, at 49, 72–74; see also Abrahms, supra note 42, at 85–86 (observing
that terrorist groups rarely pursue compromise and typically act as spoilers); cf. ALIZA
MARCUS, BLOOD AND BELIEF: THE PKK AND THE KURDISH FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE
286–91 (2007) (discussing violence by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)); Anderson, supra
note 189, at 47 (discussing violence against moderate leaders by Tamil Tigers); Thomas C.
Schelling, What Purposes Can “International Terrorism” Serve?, in VIOLENCE, TERRORISM,
AND JUSTICE 18, 21 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991) (citing the violent
“campaign of militant Palestinians against moderate Palestinian leaders”).
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insignia. For many violent non-state actors, concealing a fighter in
civilian clothes to gain a lethal advantage is not a war crime—it’s a job
196
Similarly, while LOAC bars targeting an adversary’s
description.
civilians, many non-state actors view killing civilians as a useful signal
that even those offering attenuated support for a regime are vulnerable.
For many non-state actors, targeting civilians signals commitment to the
197
cause to followers, peers, and possible funders. Like the counsels of
moderation, a turn to LOAC signaling norms would be a betrayal.
As another demonstration of skewed signaling, violent non-state
actors also often view dealings with states and NGOs as further
opportunities for strategic advantage. Groups such as the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK), Hamas, and Hezbollah regularly use truces and
198
negotiation to prepare for renewed violence. Violent non-state actors
199
divert or leverage humanitarian aid to support future violence.
Rwandan genocidaires received aid that subsidized continued
200
operations, and the Tamil Tigers channeled food aid from NGOs to
201
families that provided child soldiers. Non-state actors also use NGOs
196. See PAPE, supra note 11, at 62–63 (in operational terms, groups such as Hamas and
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) view suicide bombing as one role among many).
197. See Abrahms, supra note 42, at 100.
198. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729–30 (2010) (justifying
restrictions on assistance to foreign terrorist organizations because of organizations’ history of
manipulating such aid); MARCUS, supra note 195, at 286–95; see also Catherine Collins, Kurd
Violence Rises in Turkey, Raising Fears of a Renewed War, CHI. TRIB., May 18, 2005, at C6
(discussing return to violence by groups associated with PKK after end of truce); Ayla Jean
Yackley, 20 Injured in Turkish Resort Bomb, IRISH TIMES, July 11, 2005, at 11 (noting the
explosion of bomb for which militant wing of PKK claimed responsibility, that the bomb
injured over 20 people, including at least one critically, and that came after unilateral truce
declared by PKK). See generally Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe
Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455 (2012) (discussing terrorist groups’
tendency to game system).
199. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2727, 2729–30.
200. See FIONA TERRY, CONDEMNED TO REPEAT?: THE PARADOX OF
HUMANITARIAN ACTION 15–16 (2002) (terming humanitarian aid “potential source for
exploitation” by armed groups); Michael Barnett, Evolution Without Progress?
Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt, 63 INT’L ORG. 621, 651 (2009) (noting that
humanitarian group Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders or MSF) withdrew
from camps serving genocidal Hutu fighters because “humanitarian assistance was prolonging
suffering, not alleviating it”).
201. See Peter Popham, Tamil Tigers Break UN Pledge on Child Soldiers, INDEP.
(London), Feb. 4, 2000, at 18 (reporting that LTTE only allowed families to receive
humanitarian aid if “one or more family members perform a service,” including service as a
child soldier); cf. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 48 (2011), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/report/31-international-conference-ihl-challenge
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and international organizations to mask their commitment to violence.
The PKK has used United Nations-supervised refugee camps as sites for
202
recruitment and mobilization, while Hamas provided misleading
information to U.N. investigators on the percentage of its fighters
203
among casualties in the 2008–2009 Gaza campaign.
Again, this depiction does not represent all non-state actors. In the
Philippines, for example, a number of Islamic rebel groups have entered
into good-faith negotiations, and the government has reciprocated by
204
granting these groups a measure of autonomy. The ANC worked with
international organizations and NGOs to reform governance in South
205
Former Irish
Africa, and has maintained that commitment.
Republican Army officials entered into a unity government with
206
Protestants in Northern Ireland. Mediation efforts, in which both the
government and the non-state stakeholders participate in a common
project of reconciliation, have had encouraging results. However, these
efforts require costly signals from both sides. Governments cannot
unilaterally retreat from such shared projects without losing credibility.
Similarly, non-state actors that embark on a shared project with the
government cannot claim so readily that their adversaries’ civilians
merit killing.
In other areas, however, terrorists’ tactics have been remarkably
207
The Tamil Tigers failed in their effort to secure
shortsighted.
208
independence, despite a campaign that costs tens of thousands of lives.
The Algerian terrorist group foundered because it targeted moderates
209
The second Intifada badly misread the signals in
indiscriminately.
s-report-2011-10-31.htm (warning that sweeping attempts to restrict terrorist groups’
diversion of humanitarian aid can impede flow of aid to civilians).
202. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2729–30.
203. See Ethan Bronner & Jennifer Medina, Investigator on Gaza Was Guided by His
Past, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, at A4.
204. See Amador, supra note 189, at 6–7.
205. See Klotz, supra note 10, at 463–64.
206. See Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Research on Terrorism and Countering
Terrorism, 38 CRIME & JUST. 413, 437 (2009) (discussing how successful negotiations in
Northern Ireland ended terrorism there).
207. See Max Abrahms, Why Terrorism Does Not Work, INT’L SECURITY, Fall 2006, at
42, 56–60 (arguing that terrorist tactics such as targeting civilians harden positions on the
other side, thus frustrating strategic goals). But see PAPE, supra note 11, at 64–73 (asserting
that suicide bombing is successful, based on Hamas strategy that appears less effective in light
of later events).
208. See Anderson, supra note 189, at 47, 48.
209. See Humphrey, supra note 110, at 8–9 (discussing how indiscriminate violence in
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Israel, believing that a spate of renewed attacks on civilians would bring
Israel back to the negotiating table; Hamas made a similar mistake when
210
These episodes show the difficulty of
Israel withdrew from Gaza.
inculcating compliance with LOAC in non-state actors formed in
secrecy and committed to violence against civilians.
3. NGOs: The Watchdog’s Blind Spot
NGOs have their own problems with temporal judgment and
signaling. While they perform an essential function in hedging against
states’ myopia, this watchdog role carries the burden of hindsight bias.
Moreover, despite their role in promoting state compliance with IHL,
NGOs often lack the governance structures that would promote
comprehensive internal debate about their own proposals. Finally,
NGOs, despite the best intentions, often send the wrong signals to
violent non-state actors, putting more innocents at risk.
NGOs’ central mission is holding in check states’ tendency to cut
corners. Left to their own devices, states would surely do great violence
to LOAC’s fabric. NGOs provide an organizational and rhetorical
211
fulcrum for opposing efforts.
While NGOs’ scrutiny of state practices is salutary, their vantage
point sometimes sinks into the overly comfortable recliner of retrospect.
For NGOs, hindsight bias is a risk of the trade. Like the basketball
referee reacting to the player observed throwing a punch, a state’s
action anchors the NGO’s assessment, crowding out scrutiny of factors
that elicited the state’s response. In keeping with the limits of the
protective model’s perspective, NGOs often fail to consider the ex ante
perspective on changes in rules. They therefore miss the adverse effects
of changes that increase protection for violent non-state actors.
Consider the predicament of a military lawyer advising on targeting
for a state signatory to the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions. Article 44(3) of Additional Protocol I, if it is also
customary law applicable to non-international conflicts, provides special
protection to non-state actors who depend on secrecy and deception, by
stating that in situations where secrecy is a tactical imperative, a
combatant need not wear a distinguishing insignia. Moreover, the
Algeria means there are “no borders demarcating safe zones”).
210. See Kydd & Walter, supra note 195, at 63, 74.
211. See Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S.
“War on Terrorism,” 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 49–50 (2004).
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combatant must carry arms openly, but only during a “deployment
preceding the launching of an attack.” Suppose that a state, in the midst
212
of fighting that has already risen to the intensity of armed conflict,
knows of an imminent catastrophic attack that could cost scores of lives.
However, the actual deployment preceding the attack has yet to begin.
The state, acting in good faith, targets someone without an insignia
whom it believes to be the leader of the planned attack. That person
turns out to be a civilian. An NGO would criticize the state for possible
violations of the principle of distinction, without recognizing that the
dilution of the non-state actor’s duty to identify himself contributed to
the state’s mistake. Indeed, in at least one recent episode, NGOs and
fact-finders appointed by an international organization inaccurately
identified slain combatants as civilians and based criticism of a state on
213
Such headlong rushes to judgment
this erroneous determination.
needlessly disturb the equilibrium on which IHL depends.
212. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 566
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/
tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (“‘[T]he temporal and geographical scope of both internal and
international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of hostilities.” (internal
citation omitted)); id. at ¶ 568 (noting “scope and intensity” as criteria in determining
whether Article 3 applied to an armed conflict).
213. Compare United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human
Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories (Goldstone Report), ¶ 34, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 15, 2009) (asserting that individuals at a targeted police station were not
combatants, while acknowledging that many were members of Hamas), with Bronner &
Medina, supra note 203 (quoting Hamas spokesperson as conceding that individuals at police
station were Hamas fighters); see also Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts but Missing the Law:
The Goldstone Report, Gaza and Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 279, 281–82 (2010)
(criticizing factual and legal errors in Goldstone Report); Chris Jenks & Geoffrey Corn, Siren
Song: The Implications of the Goldstone Report on International Criminal Law 3, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788542 (noting that Goldstone Report engaged in “ex post facto
evaluation of targeting decisions . . . in contravention of a long established rule of war crimes
liability” that requires “evaluation of targeting decisions . . . through the perspective of the
military commander at the time the judgment at issue was made”). NGOs rushed to endorse
the Goldstone Report on its initial issuance, despite evidence at the time that the report
relied on flawed sources. Compare Press Release, Human Rights Watch, US: Endorse
Goldstone Report on Gaza: Promote Justice for Victims on Both Sides (Sept. 28, 2009)
(arguing against “[d]ismissal of all or part of the Goldstone report”), with Ellen Knickmeyer,
Hamas Asserts Role in Suicide Bombing, WASH. POST., Feb. 6, 2008, at A14 (contradicting
Goldstone Report by detailing claims by Hamas officials that Israeli attack on police station
killed both police officers and members of Hamas’s military wing). The sloppiness of the
Goldstone Report undermined more diligent efforts to press for investigation of actual
abuses. See Ethan Bronner & Isabel Kershner, Head of U.N. Panel Regrets Saying Israel
Intentionally Killed Gazans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, at 10 (discussing ongoing questions
about Israeli forces’ targeting of a flour mill and problems in the Goldstone Report); cf.
Isabel Kershner, Israel Rebukes 2 in Attack on U.N. Complex, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A4
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The NGOs’ commitment to ratcheting down identification
requirements also sends troubling signals to violent non-state actors.
Because of the dilution of these requirements, violent non-state actors
enjoy a win-win situation vis-á-vis both the state and moderates within
their own community. Violent acts by the state discredit moderates,
because extremists can point to state overreaching and say, “I told you
214
Criticism of states by NGOs may chill future counterterrorism
so.”
efforts, allowing extremists to argue that the concessions urged by
215
Even when a state retaliates, terrorist
moderates are unnecessary.
networks can shift their operations to another state and evade capture.
In this win-win scenario, violent non-state actors externalize the costs of
their actions, allowing them to become free riders on protective changes
to LOAC.
NGOs that supply humanitarian aid to populations harmed by
ongoing civil or international strife can also send unhelpful signals.
International law currently requires that such aid—which often fills a
desperate need—be effective: NGOs should seek to ensure that aid
216
When violent extremists on
reaches its intended civilian recipients.
any side divert aid to fund ongoing violence, aid becomes
counterproductive. Many NGOs recognize this problem and try to put
217
However, as the
in place procedures that minimize diversion.
aftermath of the Rwandan genocide demonstrated, NGOs often feel
pressure from their own funders to be “first on the ground” with
218
assistance, even if extremists divert significant portions of aid. Indeed,
(discussing Israeli reprimands of senior officers who had directed firing of artillery that hit
United Nations compound in Gaza).
214. See Kydd & Walter, supra note 195, at 69–70.
215. See id. at 62–63 (discussing how states’ concessions to terrorist organizations
encourage more attacks); LaFree & Dugan, supra note 206, at 422 (discussing incentives for
heightened violence in terrorist groups).
216. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 14, arts. 23(2)(a)–(b) (permitting state
corrective measures when state has “serious reasons for fearing” that “consignments may be
diverted from their destination” or that controls limiting non-civilian access to aid will “not be
effective”).
The ICRC Commentary on Article 23 highlights the “danger of
misappropriation” of aid, observing that, “It is essential that consignments should be subject
to strict and constant supervision from the moment they arrive until they have been
distributed.” See 4 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 182 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
217. See DANIEL MAXWELL ET AL., PREVENTING CORRUPTION IN HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE 2 (2008), available at https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachment
s/15171916/Preventing+Corruption+in+Humanitarian+Assistance+Report+July+2008.pdf?ve
rsion=1&modificationDate=1219154461000.
218. Cf. Taylor B. Seybolt, Harmonizing the Humanitarian Aid Network: Adaptive
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NGOs sometimes argue that international law bars due diligence.219 This
stance encourages violent extremists to divert aid, again making
220
extremists free riders on proposed protective changes to legal norms.
NGOs’ deficits cancel each other out in one realm: humanitarian
intervention. In that domain, NGOs’ perennial interest in curbing
human rights abuses balances its practice of second-guessing strong
democracies. While some NGOs have criticized earlier interventions,
221
222
such as Kosovo, others have offered praise, and many have been
muted in the criticism of both intervention and tactics that have been
helpful in the intervention setting, such as targeted killing.
4. Summary
By establishing time horizon and holistic signaling as overarching
norms, we can model sustainable change in LOAC. States, NGOs, and
non-state actors all have promise. However, in particular contexts, each
reveals grave deficits. Sustainable change hinges on a balance between
these three players. Suppose that states believe that NGOs have swung
too far toward the protective paradigm in proposing changes that
increase a non-state actor’s ability to free ride. Those changes will not
be sustainable. By the same token, when NGOs and domestic rule of
law institutions believe that states have swung too far toward the
utilitarian model, those changes will not stand the test of time.

Change in a Complex System, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 1027, 1041 (2009) (describing wasteful
competition among aid groups in Rwanda in 1990s).
219. See Justin Fraterman, Criminalizing Humanitarian Relief: Are US Material Support
for Terrorism Laws Compatible with International Humanitarian Law? 27 (Working Paper,
Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1750963 (arguing that U.S. prosecution of
aid workers for providing material support through humanitarian efforts would violate the
United States’ obligations and prevent NGOs from fulfilling their obligations under the
Geneva Conventions). But see Harv. Univ. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research, Humanitarian Action Under Scrutiny: Criminalizing Humanitarian Engagement 8
(Working Paper, Feb. 2011), available at http://c0186748.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/
HPCR%20CHE%202011.pdf (noting that international law “does not expressly mention a
right of humanitarian organizations” to interact with non-state actors). See generally
Anderson, supra note 43, 843–44 (criticizing NGO practices).
220. See Tamar Meisels, Combatants—Lawful and Unlawful, 26 LAW & PHIL. 31, 47–48
(2007).
221. See Paul W. Kahn, The Paradox of Riskless Warfare, 22 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 2, 2,
4 (2002).
222. See Goldstone, supra note 44, at 62.
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B. A Tale of Two Bookends: Coercive Interrogation and Direct
Participation in Hostilities
Armed with this model, we can now assess two significant post-9/11
proposals for change. The first is the government’s effort in the
aftermath of the attacks to deprive suspected terrorists of IHL
protections against coercive interrogation. The second is the ICRC’s
guidelines on targeting and direct participation in hostilities. I address
each in turn.
1. Post-9/11 Proposed Changes to Interrogation Rules
Utilitarians supported the move after September 11 by the Bush
administration to deprive suspected terrorists of legal protections under
LOAC.
The approach consisted of two steps.
First, Bush
administration officials argued that Al Qaeda and the Taliban violated
IHL because they do not wear insignias, use a fixed command structure,
223
As a result,
carry arms openly, or refrain from killing civilians.
officials claimed, Al Qaeda and Taliban members were not entitled to
POW status. Second, administration lawyers decided in the months
after 9/11 that no detainee qualified for protection under the Geneva
Conventions’ Common Article 3. According to the administration’s
lawyers, Common Article 3, which applies to conflicts “not of an
international character,” only governs conflicts within a particular
country, such as civil wars. Because Al Qaeda was a transnational
organization that the United States was fighting on territory outside the
United States, the conflict with Al Qaeda had an international character
224
In short, Bush
that precluded application of Common Article 3.
223. See Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Atty. Gen., and Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of
Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 5, at 38, 50. But cf. John F.
Murphy, Is US Adherence to the Rule of Law in International Affairs Feasible?, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 39, at 197, 216 (offering an
alternative view of whether this definition should have been applied to the Taliban, which
contained members of the armed force of Afghanistan). Some argued that until the Karzai
regime took power in Afghanistan after the United States’ intervention, Taliban fighters were
the armed forces of Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan was a party to the Geneva Conventions,
this argument went, Taliban fighters were entitled to POW status, after all. Murphy, supra, at
216. Administration lawyers countered this argument by conveniently asserting that
Afghanistan was a “failed state,” which could not be a party to the Geneva Conventions. See
Yoo, supra, at 48–52.
224. See Yoo, supra note 223, at 46–47. Afghanistan after 9/11 could have been involved
in a civil war between the Taliban and pro-United States rebel forces, which would have
qualified as a conflict “not of an international character” (NIAC). However, the
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administration officials sought to render IHL obsolete.225 Utilitarians
who shared this impatience with constraints supported the government’s
226
position.
This position encountered difficulties on at least two fronts. First,
the administration’s argument about POW status missed a step. To
determine POW status, the Geneva Convention requires more than an
adverse party’s categorical determination. A “competent tribunal” must
decide if an individual has failed to meet IHL criteria for lawful
227
Second, the drafting history and purpose of Common
combatancy.
Article 3 demonstrated that this provision established a floor for the
treatment of all detainees, whatever the classification of the conflict in
228
While utilitarians viewed these points as
which they were captured.
mere niceties, others viewed them as essential to the rule of law.
The Bush administration’s legal maneuvers amounted to a
substantial proposed change in IHL that would have allowed leaders of
one state to summarily deprive non-state actors of legal protections.
The change was suspect under both the time horizon and holistic
signaling counts. Domestic courts, while they have generally declined to
rule on the propriety of the specific interrogation techniques used by the
administration, wisely found that international law supplied a floor for
229
detainee treatment. Without such a floor, governments will overreach,
230
imposing needless harm and corrupting their own institutions. An
analysis of holistic signaling buttresses this conclusion. Other states that
must work together in counterterrorism efforts will view such results as
lacking in legitimacy. Moreover, developing states, including those with
repressive governments or fragile democracies, will perceive the United
States’ action as tacit authorization for their own coercive interrogation
administration’s argument that Afghanistan was a “failed state,” id. at 50, 53–59, dictated the
conclusion that the indigenous conflict did not include a party to the Geneva Convention and
was therefore not a NIAC subject to Geneva rules.
225. See Gonzales, Memorandum to the President, supra note 5, at 119.
226. See POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE, supra note 20, at 274
(criticizing opponents of expanded executive power as ignoring substance for process
concerns).
227. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 5.
228. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006). See generally Stephen Ellmann,
The “Rule of Law” and the Military Commission, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 760, 781–86 (2007)
(discussing Hamdan decision in light of rule of law).
229. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631.
230. See Philip Zelikow, Op-Ed, A Dubious C.I.A. Shortcut, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009,
at A27 (stating that information from interrogations using “enhanced” techniques was “a
critical part of the intelligence flow, but rarely—if ever—affected a ‘ticking bomb’ situation”).
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regimes.231 Finally, transnational publics will also doubt the legitimacy
232
of counterterrorism efforts and limit their cooperation.
2. The ICRC’s Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities
As a bookend to the Bush administration’s failed proposal, consider
recent guidelines from the ICRC that define who may be targeted as
233
The ICRC’s guidance adopted a
directly participating in hostilities.
protective approach that gave such participants an “on–off switch.” In
contrast, under traditional law of war concepts, uniformed state forces
can be targeted at any time. The ICRC’s proposed change disturbed the
equilibrium of LOAC, and ultimately put both state forces and civilians
at risk.
The ICRC reached its conclusion through a narrow definition of
234
“continuous combat function.” Those engaged in such functions can
always be targeted. However, others experience a far narrower window
of vulnerability. A narrow definition of “continuous combat function”
therefore immunizes most non-state participants most of the time. As
an example, consider an individual who assembles the explosives used
by suicide bombers. According to the ICRC’s guidance, this individual
could not be targeted as he assembled the bomb, since others would
235
have to deploy it to actually produce harm. Even if the bomb maker’s
work met this restrictive definition of causation, he could finish his task
and evade targeting by passing through a “revolving door” to ordinary

231. Cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, The International Standardization of National Security
Law, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 437, 451 (2010) (arguing that global counterterrorism
measures allow many states to camouflage their substandard governance as
counterterrorism); Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for Terrorism,
63 ME. L. REV. 131, 149–71 (2010) (analyzing policies in United States, United Kingdom,
Israel, and India).
232. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic
Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833, 835–37 (2011) (arguing that focusing investigative
resources on religious speech can be counterproductive); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and
Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 365, 366–69 (2010) (discussing positive effects of perception of legitimacy on
cooperation with law enforcement in antiterrorism policing).
233. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 33–36.
234. Id. at 33.
235. See id. at 54 (asserting that the “assembly and storing of an improvised explosive
device (IED) . . . do not cause . . . harm directly”); cf. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct
Participation in Hostilities, supra note 17, at 731 (criticizing narrow view of causation in ICRC
Guidance).
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life.236 That tactical interlude would continue until the bomb maker
237
turned again to his task, at a time and place of his choosing.
The ICRC’s guidance suffers from a time horizon skewed by
hindsight bias. The ICRC worried about the possibility of collateral
damage if the bomb maker could be targeted at all times. However, the
ICRC focused only on the state attack and ignored all contributing
events. In particular, the ICRC’s guidance failed to reckon with the
change’s effect on the ex ante perspective of the bomb maker and the
organized armed group for which he worked. Given an “on–off switch”
to regulate his risk, the bomb maker has far less reason to abandon his
dubious calling. Moreover, the group supporting his work has stronger
incentives to add to the bomb makers’ ranks.
In addition to a substantively skewed time horizon, the ICRC
displayed poor temporal judgment in its own internal deliberations.
Consider the irregular process leading to announcement of the ICRC
guidance. The ICRC assembled an international group of experts to
provide input. However, when those experts declined to endorse the
approach that ICRC officials desired, the ICRC decided to ignore the
238
An organization with sounder temporal
experts it had consulted.
judgment would have discerned the myopia in elevating a particular
outcome over respect for deliberative processes. However, the ICRC
apparently did not gain this insight.
The ICRC’s signaling was equally flawed. Because terrorist
networks that use improvised explosive devices disdain insignias, the
bomb maker is aiding and abetting killing through deception, an act of
239
Escalating terrorist violence
perfidy long condemned by LOAC.
provides political cover for a harsh state response. The ICRC’s
approach, despite its benevolent aspirations, deepens the cycle of
240
violence. While the ICRC acknowledged that it was merely expressing
236. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 44, 70–72; cf. Watkin, Opportunity Lost,
supra note 17, at 661 (criticizing ICRC’s enabling of revolving door mechanism).
237. See Watkin, Opportunity Lost, supra note 17, at 658.
238. See W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study:
No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 783–84
(2010) (reporting that ICRC added pivotal section without consulting the experts it had
convened, that a majority of experts proceeded to “vigorous[ly]” criticize the section, which
was nonetheless included in the final document).
239. See DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 13, at 233; Richard R.
Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 323, 341–42 (1952).
240. Cf. Kydd & Walter, supra note 195, at 69–70 (describing how provocation by
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its own views,241 its approach to both substance and process made this
disclaimer a self-fulfilling prophecy.
VI. TWO EMERGING ISSUES: DRONES AND NEW WAR CRIMES
Beyond the book-ended issues of coercive interrogation and direct
participation in hostilities, newer issues clamor for analysis. To flesh out
the structural model, I consider two: remote targeting of suspected
terrorists and material support of terrorism as a war crime. This Part
discusses each in turn.
A. The Case of Remote Targeting
The ICRC’s study on direct participation in hostilities only scratches
the surface on targeting issues. Adding to controversy is the United
States’ recent practice of remote targeting. Reports indicate that the
United States has targeted at least one individual in Yemen, as well as
242
Remote
others in Somalia, usually using unmanned drone aircraft.
targeting raises difficult questions on the nature of self-defense, the
appropriate geographic scope of non-international armed conflict, the
limits of sovereignty, and the intensity of violence necessary for
243
persistence of an armed conflict. A structural approach would permit
remote targeting, conditioned on observance of identification norms and
other limits such as necessity. Proxy compliance of this type is
consistent with both time horizon and holistic signaling.
Remote targeting poses tensions with LOAC norms. It typically
does not entail a response to the threat of imminent attack, and
therefore fails the historic Caroline test for self-defense, in which
terrorists pays off when states respond with hostility).
241. See ICRC GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 6.
242. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010).
243. See Chesney, supra note 45, at 19–28. Compare Kenneth Anderson, Targeted
Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR:
AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346, 346–47 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009) (arguing that drone
attacks, given appropriate constraints, are consistent with international law of self-defense),
and Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 76, at 668 (same), and John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon
Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 175, 189 (2011) (same), and Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of NonState Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. &
POL’Y 237, 274–79 (2010) (same), with U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on Targeted Killings,
¶¶ 3–4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (targeted killings generally
impermissible), and Dehn & Heller, supra, at 183, 196 (same), and O’Connell, supra note 76,
at 2 (same).
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Secretary of State Daniel Webster opined that the threat must be
244
“instant, overwhelming, leaving . . . no moment for deliberation.”
While scholars have argued that imminence needs to be defined flexibly
245
in the case of ideologically committed fighters, other objections to
remote targeting persist. By definition, remote targeting occurs within
states that are not currently engaged in an international or internal
armed conflict involving the targeting state. As the protective theorists
fear, authorizing targeting without geographic restraints could lead to
246
Remote targeting also challenges sovereignty
“war everywhere.”
because it may proceed without the consent of the state in which the
targeting takes place. Finally, remote targeting raises issues about the
intensity of armed conflict. If violence occurs below a particular
threshold, states should generally treat it as a law-enforcement matter,
not an occasion for military action. A proxy compliance framework
addresses each of these concerns.
The self-defense point is best addressed on the time horizon axis.
While curbs on myopia often require constraints on the use of force,
they do not support unduly rigid limits. Particularly when an actor such
as Al Qaeda has a clear track record of violence and has shown no
interest in renouncing that strategy, waiting for further attacks to occur
247
is a myopic strategy. These attacks may be imminent, or may require

244. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Henry Fox, British Minister
in Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1842d.asp#web1; cf. James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of
the Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, 14
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 464–69 (2006) (discussing background and relevance of
an early example of anticipatory self-defense). The United Nations Charter arguably codifies
the Caroline standard. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
245. See Schachter, supra note 76, at 312.
246. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 761 (2004);
O’Connell, supra note 76, at 26; see also CARTER, supra note 13, at 76–77 (stating that drone
killings give President “breathtakingly broad” power). But see Michael W. Lewis, A Different
Case for Restraint, 45 TULSA L. REV. 751, 756 (2010) (book review) (stating that the narrow
view of location of armed conflict is not required by international law).
247. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote
Address: The Obama Administration and International Law at the Annual Meeting of the
American
Society
of
International
Law
(Mar.
25,
2010),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; cf. Nicholas Rostow, The Laws of War
and the Killing of Suspected Terrorists: False Starts, Rabbit Holes, and Dead Ends, 63
RUTGERS L. REV. 1215, 1222–28 (2011) (praising Koh’s view that the 9/11 attacks triggered
the United States’ right of self-defense and targeting in foreign countries, while criticizing
opponents of U.S. policy on targeted killing as imposing unworkable standards).
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further planning and preparation that access to a remote haven may
facilitate. Violence planned in such havens will eventually find its way
to targeting states, inducing mass casualties that readily meet LOAC’s
248
An unduly strict imminence requirement
intensity requirement.
would force states to choose between two kinds of hindsight bias: (1) the
hindsight bias of proponents of a strict imminence requirement, who
would criticize a state for the premature use of force, or (2) the
hindsight bias of domestic constituencies, who would criticize a state for
acting too late. International law cannot retain a critical mass of support
249
if it places states in this precarious position.
The United Nations Security Council evidently agreed, because
resolutions enacted after September 11 transcended the rigidity of
250
Webster’s formulation and ratified a more flexible conception of self251
defense. Applicable only to proven terrorist threats, this test used the
252
eventual certainty of attack as a proxy for Webster’s imminence
253
requirement. Using a sliding scale that balances two or more elements
248. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 566–68
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf.
249. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 549–56 (2002).
250. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 249 (4th ed.
2005) (noting that “Webster’s prose was inclined to overstatement”)
251. For example, Security Council Resolution 1373 stipulates that member states
should “combat [terrorism] by all means” and “work together . . . to prevent and suppress
terrorist attacks.” See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 pmbl. (Sept. 28, 2001).
252. Cf. Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
44–46 (2003) (discussing problem of intransigence related to ideological commitments of
members of terrorist networks).
253. The International Court of Justice has held that the right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter was limited to cases of “armed attack . . . imputable
to a foreign State.” See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9, 2004). This
interpretation contravenes both the text of the provision and sound policy. The text of
Article 51 refers only to attacks “against” a state, and says nothing about the source of those
attacks. See DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 250, at 204.
Jurists and commentators have vigorously criticized the court’s rationale, arguing that it
enshrines artificial distinctions. See Legal Consequences, 2004 I.C.J. at 211, ¶ 16 (Higgins, J.,
concurring); id. at 240–41, ¶ 3 (Buergenthal, J., dissenting); Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense
and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 70–
72 (2005); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the
Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 52, 57–59 (2005). For historical background on
America’s massive internal conflict, see Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War
During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1845–47 (2010), which argues that the
Civil War Supreme Court generally viewed the laws of war as prevailing over otherwise
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as a proxy for a conjunctive test that analyzes these elements separately
is a common jurisprudential move that also has echoes in the criminal
254
Indeed, historical sources show ample
law’s view of self-defense.
255
support for this more pragmatic approach to the jus ad bellum.
A narrower approach to self-defense would also send a dangerous
signal to host states that are weak or sympathetic to terrorist networks.
The United Nations framework that required states to combat terrorism
is vulnerable to hold-out problems. Weak states cannot preserve the
monopoly on the use of force that guarantees the public good of
security. In such states, contending factions buy off officials to gain
immunity from prosecution. Allowing officials to take bribes from
256
terrorist networks in exchange for a safe harbor would undermine the
post-September 11 United Nations framework. Permitting officials who
feel an ideological affinity with terrorist networks to harbor them has
the same effect. The United Nations has no readily available means for
holding such officials accountable. Remote targeting gives victim states
a remedy that is not contingent on host country officials’ fickle
allegiances.
To signal an overall disposition to observe LOAC, proxy compliance
in remote targeting would have to observe a number of stringent
conditions. It could proceed only if a host nation for a terrorist network
257
For countries that
was unable or unwilling to apprehend suspects.
applicable constitutional norms.
254. See Amos N. Guiora, Self-Defense—From the Wild West to 9/11: Who, What, When,
41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631, 652–53 (2008).
255. See VATTEL, supra note 68, at 249 (stating that right to self-defense is “in direct
ratio to the degree of probability attending it, and to the seriousness of the evil with which
one is threatened”).
256. Terrorist networks certainly have cash on hand, often gained from drug trafficking
and other illicit activities. See Phil Williams, Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime:
Nexus, Appropriation, or Transformation?, in COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
126, 138–39 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E. Eckert eds., 2008) (detailing the involvement of
Tamil Tigers in criminal conduct, including heroin trade, human trafficking, gun-running, and
extortion); Eric Talbot Jensen, Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of Armed
Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 704–05 (2012) (discussing non-state actors’ involvement in
drug trade). See generally HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 27–28 (noting “strategic alliances”
between organized crime and terrorist groups).
257. See Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War Against AlQaeda, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 25–36 (2011) (looking to neutrality law to define “enemy” that
can be targeted or detained); Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 499–503 (2012) (finding
authority for targeting decisions in law of neutrality, which authorizes state that has been
victimized (“victim state”) by forces that have received sanctuary from another state
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possess the monopoly on the use of force inherent in sovereignty and
that are willing to use that force to comply with United Nations Security
Council resolutions, remote targeting would be off the table. Moreover,
remote targeting would only be permissible against fighters belonging or
258
That limitation ties remote
with operational ties to Al Qaeda.
259
260
targeting to international and domestic endorsement of self-defense
against terrorism. Other countries contending with terrorists from
different groups that have not been the subject of specific Security
Council resolutions, such as Israel, Turkey, or Colombia, would not be
authorized to remotely target members of those organizations. The
targeting state would also have to observe the principle of
261
proportionality. While judicial review of the targeting decision would
262
not be required, a government lawyer using reasonable diligence
(“territorial state”) to cross border of territorial state in order to remove threat); Matthew C.
Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 429, 442 (2010) (quoting John Bellinger, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Sec’y of State,
Legal Issues in War on Terrorism, Address Before the London School of Economics (Oct. 31,
2006)); George H. Aldrich, Book Review, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 167, 170 (2011). But see Kevin
Jon Heller, The Law of Neutrality Does Not Apply to the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, and It’s a
Good Thing, Too: A Response to Chang, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 115 (2011) (arguing that
neutrality law is inappropriate framework because it must be applied symmetrically, which
would also bar states from assisting in efforts against Al Qaeda); Rebecca Ingber, Untangling
Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 75 (2011)
(criticizing Chang’s reliance on neutrality law as creating unduly broad capacity to detain).
258. See Chesney, supra note 45, at 20–22. To be part of Al Qaeda in this sense, a target
would have to be part of an operational chain of command with Al Qaeda leadership at the
summit. Id. at 21.
259. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 pmbl. (Sept. 28, 2001); DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 250, at 207–08; cf. Mark A. Drumbl,
Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the
International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 16–22 (2002) (arguing, in context of United
States military intervention in Afghanistan, that the United Nations Security Council
resolution should not be viewed as authorizing use of force, but that intervention could be
viewed under international law as self-defense against “armed attack”).
260. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2113–14 (2005).
261. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Israel ¶ 41 [2005]
(Isr.); GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTLAWS, & TERRORISTS:
LESSONS FROM THE WAR ON TERRORISM 91 (2010) (arguing that targeting state’s greater
“control over the time, means, and methods of strike mandates . . . a heightened degree of
care” in avoiding collateral damage).
262. Compare Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010) (discussing basis
for government’s alleged targeting decision but ultimately holding that matter constituted
political question), with Guiora, supra note 254, at 672–73 (arguing for judicial review in
special court), and Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted
Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 445–50 (2009) (suggesting need for some
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would have to sign off on each of these criteria prior to initiation of an
263
attack. These measures, while they do not eliminate the risk of abuse,
would signal continued fidelity to the moderate disposition that has
264
guided LOAC.
While some NGOs will still be skeptical, others will recognize that
these same weapons can facilitate humanitarian intervention against
abusive state actors. Just as waiting for terrorist networks to strike
yields opportunity costs, waiting for world opinion and trade sanctions
to alleviate human rights abuses can cause irreparable harm. The
Security Council’s ratification of NATO’s Kosovo intervention confirms
265
this truth. Many NGOs supported the Kosovo intervention, sought
action to deal with the slaughter in Darfur, and supported action in
Libya. Calibrated remote attacks on Al Qaeda fighters signal that
strong democracies retain the ability to act against other human rights
266
For this reason, remote targeting that complies with
violators.
identification norms such as the principle of distinction and meets the
other requirements discussed above will not prompt uniform opposition
267
from NGOs. That lack of unanimity, coupled with tacit support from
procedural safeguards).
263. See SOLIS, supra note 49, at 531 (discussing the role of the attorney-advisor).
264. For efforts to reframe targeting law that provide further safeguards, see Jennifer C.
Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside
the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049532 (seeking to formulate targeting criteria that will respect both
LOAC and human rights norms); and Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting
and
Detention,
110
MICH.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2012),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042172 (arguing for uniform approach to detention and targeting
centering on availability of alternatives to confinement or use of lethal force).
265. See Goldstone, supra note 44, at 61 (noting “remarkably low civilian casualty rate”
in Kosovo intervention, apparently due to use of precision bombing technology); cf. Edward
C. Luck, Building a Norm: The Responsibility to Protect Experience, in MASS ATROCITY
CRIMES, supra note 44, at 108, 110–14 (discussing ebb and flow in evolution of responsibility
to protect against atrocities).
266. Cf. Eric Schmitt & Steven Lee Myers, Sharper Surveillance and NATO
Coordination Aided Rebel Advance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2011, at A9 (discussing use of
drones in Libya conflict).
267. NGOs have run the gamut in their responses to targeted killing, with a median
response seeking more concrete articulation of targeting criteria. See Gabor Rona, Letter to
the Editor, A Spotlight on Drone Strikes in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at A22; see
also Scott Shane, C.I.A. Is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2011, at A1 (analyzing conflicting reports, including independent experts who believe that
precautions for drone strikes have minimized but not eliminated civilian casualties); Scott
Wilson, On Sept. 11, a Challenge for Obama, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2010, at A1 (quoting
Tom Malinowski, Washington director of Human Rights Watch, as arguing that Obama
administration’s overall respect for rule of law and repudiation of torture “legitimize[d] . . .
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domestic institutions such as courts,268 suggests that remote targeting
that complies with identification norms will be a sustainable change to
269
LOAC.
B. Trying Material Support in Military Commissions
It is always fitting to end at a beginning, and Salim Hamdan’s
material support conviction before a military commission offers a useful
final example of the structural approach. From a utilitarian perspective,
Hamdan’s prosecution was a useful expedient for the government.
Hamdan’s trial in 2008 was a dry run for bigger trials that have yet to
occur, such as the trial of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh
270
More generally, the charge of material support for Al
Mohammed.
Qaeda did not require heavy lifting by the government, since in both its
271
ordinary criminal law incarnation and iteration in the Military
pursuing al-Qaeda” through tactics including drone strikes).
268. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
269. Key human rights activists and scholars now serve in the Obama administration,
shaping a policy that both targets suspected terrorists and participates in humanitarian
interventions. See Paul Starobin, Op-Ed, A Moral Flip-Flop? Defining ‘War,’ N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2011, at SR5 (quoting Harold Koh, noted Yale Law scholar on human rights and
current legal adviser to the State Department, who has also stated the administration’s
position supporting drone attacks, as championing intervention in Libya because of need to
“prevent[] atrocities,” despite tension between ongoing intervention and timetable in War
Powers Resolution); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Still Crusading, but Now on the Inside, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2011, at A10 (discussing role in Obama administration played by human rights
advocate Samantha Power).
270. Some have argued that a more appropriate venue for such prosecutions and for
terrorism-related cases generally is a new national security court. See GLENN SULMASY, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A NATURAL EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF
TERROR 173–75 (2009); Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic
Choice: Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 87, 94 (2008). Consideration of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
271. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2006) (prohibiting material support to designated
foreign terrorist organizations); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712,
2731 (2010) (upholding statute); Margulies, Advising Terrorism, supra note 198 (explaining
and defending Holder); see also Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory
Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 474–86
(2007) (discussing the government’s ability to bring anticipatory prosecutions on material
support charges); Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 12–18 (2005) (discussing background of
statute); Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers
for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173, 189–94 (2003) (discussing
statute’s ramifications for defense lawyers). For criticisms of Holder, see David Cole, The
First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First
Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 148–49 (2012) (criticizing Holder as
unduly narrowing free speech protections); Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the
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Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)272 it does not require specific intent to
engage in violence.
Despite this utilitarian bonanza, however,
Hamdan’s conviction raises serious problems under a structural view.
273
The general material support charged in Hamdan’s case skews the
time horizon. Identification norms upheld by courts provide that
conduct merits punishment only if an individual had notice at the time
of the conduct at issue that her acts violated the law. Without the
principle of legality, a government can readily make up crimes after the
fact to target its opponents. While disregarding this principle in LOAC
cases might not spill over into ordinary adjudication in civilian courts,
that claim seems both empirically questionable and beside the point:
274
Violations of core norms are problematic even in small doses.
The MCA’s criminalization of material support to Al Qaeda clashes
with the principle of legality. Courts cannot look to the MCA itself,
because it was enacted years after the conduct at issue took place.
Instead, courts have to look at the customs and common law of war.
There, however, the record is wanting. The Court of Military
Commission Review decision cites three strands of precedent to support
its upholding of the material support conviction: the Civil War
275
“bushwhacker” cases, the Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) theory used
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
276
(ICTY), and the “membership” cases adjudicated by the Nuremberg
277
Unfortunately, none of these strands is sturdy enough to
tribunals.
bear the weight. Each requires something not present in the material
support cases: a nexus with specific LOAC violations involving injury to
persons or property.
The bushwhacker cases are most easily distinguished.
The
bushwhackers were small criminal bands that operated with minimal

Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1455, 1457–58 (2011)
(suggesting that Court’s view ignored difficulty of peaceful protest against dictatorial
regimes).
272. See 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (2006).
273. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1258–59 (C.M.C.R. 2011)
(including acting as bin Laden’s driver and bodyguard as well as dealing in weapons).
274. See Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo Courts, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 172, 179–80 (2008) (discussing constitutional problems with trying material
support cases in military commissions).
275. See Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1279, 1299–1301, 1313.
276. Id. at 1284–85.
277. Id. at 1306–07.
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authorization during the Civil War, robbing and pillaging at will.278 Any
member of the group, because of its small size, would have participated
directly in the bushwhackers’ depredations. None involved a defendant
like Hamdan, who performed ministerial tasks several steps removed
from the operational planning or execution of a terrorist plot.
279
The JCE strand is also slender. While JCE is still controversial,
even on its own terms it does not stretch far enough to reach the
conduct here. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the ICTY tied JCE to direct
280
participation in an operation that caused the murder of civilians.
Tadic participated in the forced removal of men from a village, which
281
was already illegal under international human rights law. The tribunal
merely held that individuals who participated in the forced removal
were liable for reasonably foreseeable acts that occurred in the course of
282
the operation.
The Court of Military Commission Review’s final gambit was the
“membership” cases brought before the international Nuremberg
283
Military Tribunal after World War II. This strand is the weakest of all.
Prosecutors and tribunals at Nuremberg recognized the due process
dangers in criminalizing mere membership and limited the prosecutions
accordingly. After initially planning to charge Nazi entities like the
Gestapo and SS with being criminal organizations and then charge
thousands of individual members, prosecutors became anxious that
284
As a result,
membership was an unduly amorphous basis for guilt.
they largely abandoned their plans, citing membership as the sole charge
285
in only three cases. In other cases, defendants were also charged with
serious crimes against humanity, usually the killing of civilians. Ten

278. See FRANCIS LIEBER, GUERRILLA PARTIES
THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR 16–17 (1862).

CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO

279. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal
Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 84–86 (2005) (claiming due process problems with JCE doctrine,
which in some tribunals has been read to require little in the way of knowledge or intent by
defendant).
280. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 170–71 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
281. See id. ¶ 178.
282. See id. ¶¶ 184, 204.
283. See United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1306–07 (C.M.C.R. 2011).
284. See Jonathan A. Bush, Lex Americana: Constitutional Due Process and the
Nuremberg Defendants, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 515, 533–35 (2001).
285. See id. at 534 & n.75.
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defendants were acquitted of more serious charges and convicted solely
286
of membership offenses. Virtually all of those convicted were senior
287
officials in criminal entities—principals rather than foot soldiers.
Striving to find an analog to Hamdan’s foot-soldier status, the court
288
Graf,
cited the example of noncommissioned officer Mathias Graf.
however, served in a German unit that was directly responsible for the
murder of scores of civilians. That unit, in turn, was part of the
notorious Einsatzgruppen, which killed hundreds of thousands of
289
Even so, the tribunal sentenced Graf to time
noncombatants.
290
served. In sum, the Nuremberg tribunals provide virtually no support
for making a bit player’s service a war crime; indeed, they offer a
291
cautionary tale on the difficulties inherent in this task.
The government has not bolstered its case by arguing in the D.C.
Circuit that, regardless of the international law of war, the “U.S.
common law of war” authorized trial of material support charges against

286. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
287. For example, Dr. Helmut Poppendick was Chief Physician of Main Race and
Settlement Office and Konrad Meyer-Hetling was chief of the planning office and helped
craft the plan for deportations of ethnic minorities from German-controlled Eastern Europe.
Id. at 1307–08. The court also discussed defendants Flick and Steinbrinck, charter members
of the quaint group, “Friends of Himmler.” Id. at 1308. The court failed to mention that the
defendants were not merely friends of the psychopathic head of the SS, but actually
bankrolled his infamously lethal organization. See 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 1221
(1952) (“[E]ach of [the defendants] gave to Himmler . . . a blank check.”).
288. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
289. 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 369–70 (1952) [hereinafter 4 WAR CRIMES
TRIALS]; see also CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE
BATTALION 101 AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND 18–25 (1992) (recounting detailed
history of one typical Einsatzgruppen unit).
290. 4 WAR CRIMES TRIALS, supra note 288, at 587.
291. The analysis should be different when a defendant has furnished direct and
substantial support to commission of a war crime. For example, material support would be an
appropriate charge for an individual who, with advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks, helped
fashion Al Qaeda’s propaganda effort. Given the importance of propaganda to Al Qaeda, it
would be both fair and accurate to describe such an individual as a principal in the
organization, like the “Friends of Himmler” convicted of membership offenses at Nuremberg.
See United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141 1159–61, 1264 (C.M.C.R. 2011)
(upholding conviction of individual who served as bin Laden’s personal propagandist, at bin
Laden’s order produced video urging perfidious attacks on U.S. military targets, and prepared
martyrdom wills for two of the September 11 hijackers).
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Hamdan in a military commission.292 The “U.S. common law of war”
argument does not rely on the Constitution’s Define and Punish Clause,
which empowers Congress to “define and punish . . . Offenses against
293
the Law of Nations.” Instead, the government’s new argument relies
on Congress’s power under Article I, section 8 to make rules for the
army and navy, as well as other textual anchors of Congress’s authority
294
over war. However, this pivot to a posited “U.S. common law of war”
ignores the Framers’ profound concern with signaling the new republic’s
295
fidelity to international norms. Given the Framers’ concern, it would
seem incongruous for the Constitution to permit Congress to bypass the
requirements of the Define and Punish Clause and authorize military
commissions under other provisions.
296
Supreme Court precedent tells a similar tale. In Ex Parte Quirin,
the Court catalogued the various sources of Congress’s and the
President’s power over armed conflict, but then focused primarily on the
Define and Punish Clause. Congress, according to the Court, has always
297
viewed the law of war as “part of the law of nations.” In Yamashita v.
298
Styer, the Court reinforced this understanding, noting that in the
Articles of War, Congress, pursuant to the Define and Punish Clause,
299
“incorporated . . . by reference” the law of war. This body of law, the

292. See Brief for the United States, Hamdan v. United States, No. 11-1257, 24–46 (D.C.
Circuit Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/
Hamdan-Brief-for-US-As-Filed.pdf.
293. U.S. Const., art I, § 8, cl. 10.
294. Id. cl. 14; see also id. cl. 1 (empowering Congress to “provide for the common
Defence”); id. cl. 11 (empowering Congress to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”); id. cl. 18 (empowering
Congress to enact laws “which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers”).
295. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 28, at 233 (James Madison) (noting that
the Define and Punish Clause cured the problem posed by Articles of Confederation, which
did not empower the federal government to remedy offenses by individual states or citizens
against law of nations, and “consequently le[ft] it in the power of any indiscreet member to
embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 715–18 (2004) (discussing Framers’ concerns, which were precipitated by incidents
involving attacks on foreign diplomats in New York and Philadelphia that violated principle
of diplomatic immunity); cf. J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define
and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 874–80 (2007)
(discussing role in Constitution’s enactment of incidents involving attacks on diplomats).
296. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
297. Id. at 27–28.
298. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
299. Id. at 7–8.
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Court noted, included the “system of military common law . . . deemed
300
Stressing this corpus’s international pedigree,
applicable by courts.”
the Court observed that the law of war also included international
301
Since the Hague
agreements such as the Hague Convention.
302
Convention imposed new restraints on states in conducting warfare,
this observation amounted at least to tacit acknowledgment that United
States practice regarding the law of war was authoritative not in its own
right, but only as it informed interpretation of the “law of nations.”
Embracing the government’s “U.S. common law of war” theory would
turn this venerable understanding on its head.
Making general material support, such as driving or cooking, into a
war crime is also shortsighted because it discourages reconciliation.
Barring prosecution for such conduct is a corollary of the separation of
jus ad bellum and jus in bello. This separation paves the way for peace
by assuring foot soldiers for a regime that has violated jus ad bellum that
303
surrender will not subject them to punitive measures. If individuals in
this position face prosecution for war crimes, they have little reason to
304
Bitterness undermines deliberation, igniting a
lay down their arms.
new cycle of violence.
Vindicating the bitter-enders, classifying material support as a war
crime signals that war crimes prosecutions are merely a form of victor’s
justice. This sentiment erodes LOAC’s legitimacy. To preserve the
legitimacy of war crimes prosecutions, a state must demonstrate that it
305
While civilian
promotes universal norms, not parochial interests.
300. Id. at 8.
301. Id.
302. See Schmitt, supra note 4, at 800; Watkin, supra note 4, at 21.
303. See generally Sloane, supra note 59, 48–49 (discussing importance of separation).
304. Protective theorists make this point. See Pejic, supra note 91, at 354 (quoting
Additional Protocol II, art. 6(5), and stating the IHL encourages states to grant the “‘broadest
possible amnesty’” at conclusion of hostilities). Successful transitions have frequently taken
this turn. See JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 4–22 (2004) (stating that ancient Athenian democrats discovered that imposing
sanctions on officials of previous oligarchical regime was counterproductive, while
reconciliation provided those officials with a stake in the new regime’s success).
305. Cf. Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization Through Trials for Violations of
International Law: Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 427, 471–90 (2009) (arguing that military commission
proceedings that are perceived as illegitimate do not mobilize global communities against
terrorism). See generally Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda
Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 613–20 (2002)
(arguing that international law supports use of military tribunals).

18 - MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE FOG OF WAR REFORM

7/9/2012 10:27 PM

1483

criminal law targets a vast spectrum of offenses, including violations of
health and safety rules and white-collar crimes, war crimes should be
defined within a narrower bandwidth that focuses on violence against
civilians, or against the wounded, helpless, or deceived. Prosecution of
the senior officials, who comprised the bulk of the Nuremberg
defendants, passed this test. Prosecution of defendants who conspired
306
to commit specific crimes of violence does as well. That clear signaling
is necessary to overcome the special stressors that congeal in the fog of
war. In contrast, prosecuting people for driving leaders dilutes the
307
opprobrium we appropriately attach to war crimes.
Finally, criticism by NGOs of this particular use of military
commissions does not reflect the hindsight bias that plagues NGOs
elsewhere. Hindsight bias is most damaging when it forces a party to
incur substantial opportunity costs. For example, limiting a state’s
ability to target a bomb maker can produce civilian and combatant
casualties once the bomb maker’s latest creation reaches its intended
victims. Hamdan’s case does not present this problem because
Hamdan’s regular service to bin Laden would have made him a person
directly participating in hostilities whom an opposing party could
308
309
Either of these options would have removed
target or detain.
306. A plurality of the Supreme Court asserted that conspiracy charges were not triable
in military commissions, even when the defendant had participated in a specific plot. See
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 598–613 (2006). However, Justice Stevens’ opinion also
cited examples of conspiracy charges tried before military commissions, including charges
against the conspirators in the plot to assassinate President Lincoln. Id. at 604–09. Moreover,
Justice Kennedy declined to join the four-person plurality that found that conspiracy charges
in military commissions were categorically precluded. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Kennedy’s absence casts significant doubt on the durability of the plurality opinion’s
categorical approach.
307. In its June 2011 Hamdan decision, the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review
cites a passage from a Nuremberg tribunal case that analogizes a convicted defendant to a
cook on a pirate vessel. United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1309 (C.M.C.R.
2011) (citing 4 WAR CRIMES TRIALS, supra note 288, at 372–73). Here, as well, however,
several grains of salt are required. Pirate vessels are basically bushwhackers at sea, and a
cook is likely in either context to share in the plunder and the preceding mayhem. Moreover,
the Nuremberg case concerned soldiers in the Einsatzgruppen, who as noted earlier were
directly responsible for many civilian deaths. Finally, the Hamdan court failed to note that
the passage is not from an opinion of the tribunal, but from a statement by the prosecutor
Telford Taylor. 4 WAR CRIMES TRIALS, supra note 289, at 369, 373. Prosecutors’ statements
may be eloquent (as this one was), but they are not precedent.
308. See Bill Boothby, “And for such time as”: The Time Dimension to Direct
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741, 753–55 (2010) (discussing
membership in an organized armed group as a basis for targeting). Even if Hamdan were not
deemed a legitimate target, Osama bin Laden would certainly have been, based on his place
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Hamdan from hostilities for the duration of the conflict. The availability
of these options reduces the opportunity cost of foregoing a military
commission proceeding.
VII. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
A model’s approach to particular cases can sometimes mask deeper
flaws. In this connection, a number of critiques of the structural
approach merit response. First, a structural approach that relies heavily
on flexibility may be a contradiction in terms. Second, the approach
here may unduly elevate the status of NGOs in IHL, at the expense of
more formal entities such as transnational tribunals and the United
Nations. Finally, the approach here may be Eurocentric, failing to
understand the distinctively non-Western virtues of tactics employed by
terrorist networks. I discuss each criticism in turn.
A. Structure and Flexibility
One critique might question the flexible nature of the test here.
Some distinguished scholars would argue that a structural theory should
310
be more formal, hinging on express approval of stakeholders. In
contrast, the test here has a role for formality, particularly in the general
preference for judicial review, but often opts for a more informal
approach to observance of time horizon and signaling norms. There is
no contradiction, however, in referring to the theory advanced here as
structural in nature.
The American constitutional tradition demonstrates that a structural
turn does not require rigidity. In structural views of the United States
Constitution, courts and commentators have regularly allowed for play
in the joints. Formal requirements can give way to pragmatic proxies.
For example, executive authority can accrue not only through express
legislative consent, but also through a course of dealing over time that
311
includes legislative acquiescence.
in the Al Qaeda command structure. If the United States or its allies had successfully
targeted bin Laden during Hamdan’s service to him, Hamdan’s death in the course of this
operation would not have violated the proportionality principle.
309. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 869, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ruling that individual
who had participated in training camps and served as regular cook for Al Qaeda forces was
detainable), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); cf. 590 F.3d at 884–85 (Williams, J.,
concurring) (asserting that IHL appropriately informed decision about detention).
310. See, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 20, at 825.
311. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686–88 (1981) (upholding presidential
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Moreover, a certain amount of play in the joints promotes structural
soundness. Engineers build flexibility into structures like bridges for
exactly this reason. As Justice Jackson acknowledged in his landmark
concurrence on the separation of powers, maintaining constitutionalism
312
that can respond to the
requires a “workable government”
313
“imperatives of events.”
In this sense, a measure of flexibility is also consistent with a linear
time horizon as parties decide whether to embark on a shared project,
such as the governance of armed conflict. A party relatively happy with
the status quo at Time 1 may be unwilling to part with any of its options
if it worries that constraints will place it at a disadvantage at Time 2.
However, allowing some revision at Time 2 defuses these doubts about
initial cooperation.
Initial cooperation may also be lacking if change becomes too easy,
but the model here addresses that question as well. Change will not
occur without uniform approval or acquiescence among domestic
stakeholders at Level 1 and a critical mass of approval or acquiescence
among NGOs at Level 2. Those conditions promote stable governance
and discourage the volatility that could lead back to a Hobbesian state
of nature.

negotiation of claims settlement with Iran); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[C]ongressional inertia, indifference, or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility.”); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive power’
vested in the President.”); see also WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN,
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 114–15 (1994) (describing
“customary national security law” and presidential powers); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE
OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 102–05 (2006)
(analyzing history of “acquiescence doctrine”); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1705 (2011) (book review) (discussing congressional acquiescence as
providing leeway to executive).
312. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor
W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999516 (arguing that historical patterns of
legislative acquiescence may supplement constitutional text regarding scope of executive
power).
313. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); cf. id. at 638 n.5 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (discussing Jefferson’s decision to complete Louisiana Purchase, despite his
constitutional doubts).
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B. The Role of NGOs
Some may also criticize the importance placed on NGOs in this
structural vision. Apart from the ICRC, NGOs have no formal role in
314
international law, so it may seem incongruous to discuss them without
providing for more official entities such as transnational tribunals and
international organizations. Nonetheless, there are advantages to
315
focusing on NGOs that other approaches keyed to formal actors miss.
NGOs contribute in large measure to the agenda of LOAC and the
language used to describe that agenda. They interact with courts
through pleadings and help mobilize communities around litigation and
316
other forms of advocacy. In fulfilling this role, they have a profound
influence on the prospects for legal change. Indeed, certain tribunals,
including the European Court of Human Rights, have fashioned a
317
jurisprudence that limits counterterrorism initiatives, tracking NGOs’
efforts. That influence is sometimes healthy and sometimes too
reminiscent of the hindsight bias that plagues the protective view. In
either event, it is a force to be reckoned with.
International organizations also play a role, for example through
counterterrorism initiatives such as Security Council Resolutions 1368
318
and 1373. These measures, however, derive from the advocacy efforts
of major states, including the United States. Because of the veto
possessed by the United States and the Council’s other permanent
members, the Security Council only acts when major states find
common ground. Given this reality, looking to a consensus among
314. The ICRC does not have a formal law-making capacity, but engages in
humanitarian activities with respect to prisoners of war and civilians affected by armed
conflict. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 9.
315. In this respect, the approach here borrows from criminal law scholarship on
pragmatic interactions between courts, prosecutors, and legislatures. See Daniel C. Richman
& William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual
Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 590–91, 597–98 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529–68 (2001); cf. Chesney,
supra note 34, at 1385–91 (discussing importance of functional and prudential considerations
in national security law).
316. See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE
L.J. 891, 942, 945–49 (2008); Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices
of Advocacy Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 358–61 (2009).
317. See Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 30 BHRC 637, at 45–62 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. July 7, 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,ECHR,,IRQ,,4e25
466e2,0.html (holding that, absent express derogation, state violated human rights law by
detaining individual in Iraq in course of role as part of United Nations-sponsored force).
318. See supra note 76.
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major states as a structural surrogate for international organizations is a
reasonable strategy.
C. Distinction and Essentialism
One might also argue that the norms of IHL, such as the principle of
distinction, are a creature of the asymmetry between those states with
advanced weaponry and parties without it. Paul Kahn has written that
“the asymmetrical capacities of Western . . . forces . . . themselves create
319
the conditions for increasing use of terrorism.” If there is a cycle of
320
destruction, Kahn added, the West is to blame. Structuring a system
to encourage compliance with LOAC, on this view, merely perpetuates
inequality.
Unfortunately, this argument is both radically over- and underinclusive. It is over-inclusive because it disregards the many compelling
non-Western approaches that have accomplished change without
targeting innocents or violating other LOAC norms. From Gandhi to
the social-media-driven Arab Spring, non-Western movements have
been innovators in nonviolent methods. Treating the targeting of
innocents as a hallmark of non-Western practice seems inaccurate as
well as invidious.
Moreover, the under-inclusiveness of this argument is also a major
problem. Suppose that Western powers decided, as Bush administration
officials did in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, that the rules barring
coercive interrogation were useless in combating the non-Western
terrorist tactics that essentialists so matter-of-factly describe. It would
be unacceptable to view this change as a resourceful Western solution to
non-Western terrorism. Essentialist logic, however, is helpless to rebut
that characterization. Essentialism is at bottom very similar to LOAC
violations: once it becomes well ensconced, it quickly pervades the
landscape in ways that the originator cannot control. Few arguments
would seem more divorced from both sound temporal judgment and
holistic signaling.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Non-state actors challenged LOAC framework after September 11.
Without reciprocity as a guide, both states and NGOs sought changes.

319. See Kahn, supra note 221, at 6.
320. See id.
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However, criteria for assessing those proposed changes have been
elusive.
Contending schools of thought have sought to control the terrain of
LOAC. Both the utilitarian and protective turns, however, have fallen
short. The utilitarians offer a promising toolkit that accurately identifies
certain non-state groups, such as terrorist networks, as free riders on
LOAC norms. However, in casting their lot with states, utilitarians
leave their toolkit behind and unwisely rely on the sometimes flawed
judgment of state leaders. While protective theorists bring to the table a
distrust of the state that heads off this tendency, they focus unduly on
state policies and fail to acknowledge that asymmetries between states
and terrorists on matters such as identification requirements ultimately
put civilians at risk.
To remedy these problems, this Article suggests a structural model
which views changes to LOAC as a two-level game played within states
and between states and NGOs. Under the model, states propose
utilitarian changes, which at Level 1 require approval from domestic
stakeholders such as the military and the courts. Internal divisions will
prompt unified NGO opposition, making a proposed change
unsustainable, as the Bush administration discovered with its harsh
interrogation policies and effort to remove IHL protections from
suspected terrorists. In contrast, a unified state response will often split
NGOs at Level 2, paving the way for change. By the same token, NGOs
need to cultivate support from Level 1 stakeholders. At both levels, the
game hinges on two values: linear time horizons and holistic signaling.
Time horizons seek to curb both shortsighted thinking and its close
cousin, hindsight bias. Holistic signaling entails messages of fidelity to
LOAC framework and the prospects for continued global cooperation.
States can develop institutions such as courts that promote both
temporal judgment and holistic signaling but are often tempted toward
skewed time horizons during times of crisis. Non-state actors can
develop comparable institutions, but the need for secrecy and signaling
to other non-state actors often undermines this process. NGOs are
vigilant against state backsliding, but that vigilance comes at the price of
hindsight bias and a failure to adequately gauge incentives for violent
non-state actors.
The structural approach aids in analyzing current LOAC issues.
Proposals like the Bush administration’s harsh interrogation policies and
the ICRC’s direct participation in hostilities guidance fail both the
signaling and temporal judgment tests. Carefully tailored remote
targeting that observes identification norms is an example of sustainable

18 - MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE FOG OF WAR REFORM

7/9/2012 10:27 PM

1489

change.
However, trying material support charges in military
commissions is problematic, both undermining the principle of legality
and sending ominous signals about victors’ justice.
The structural model is far from perfect. It may take too dim a view
of non-state actors and give states too much credit. It also may accord
NGOs too large a normative role, given their lack of formal status.
Others may have models that depict change more accurately or that
stress different values. However, stressing a linear time horizon and
holistic signaling defuses rhetoric and sharpens deliberation about
LOAC changes in the wake of September 11. Those virtues amply
reward the effort.

